

## 第三部 非公式交渉關係文書

- (1) 昭和四年十一月十二日出淵大使ニ手交セル比率問題ニ關スル  
米國國務長官覺書

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE.

You have asked me for an expression of my policy as to the proposed ratio for Japan in the several classes to be dealt with at the London Conference, and you have suggested that Japan desires ratio not of 5—3 but 10—7 in the cruiser class particularly as to the type armed with 8-inch guns.

You will realize that one of the great difficulties of the Conference will come in the desires of France and Italy to keep same ratios with each other and it may well be said (?) that the word “ratio” will be an unfortunate word in the London Conference. It may be possible that the eventual settlement will be made as a result of actual conditions in ships rather than ratios.

I have not reached final opinions on Conference matters and hope to go to the Conference with no fixed positions on the topics that are to come up. I look forward to the personal meetings with your representatives to get a knowledge of your particular problems and wishes, and recall the effective support for reduction which the Japanese delegation afforded our delegation both at Geneva and Washington. In that light you will understand my answer. You will understand also I am speaking what is in my mind with great frankness and not guardedly as if I were stating final positions.

I do not believe that a change in the attitude of the Japanese Government on its ratio in the cruiser class increasing it to 10—7 is likely to be conducive to the success of the Conference. I desire to state quite frankly and at some length my reasons for my belief.

The Washington Conference was an attempt to limit naval armament in order to remove the incentive of one na-

tion to build against another. The formula which was proposed by that Conference to end the competition was that Great Britain and the United States should agree that their fleets should be equal, the theory being that inasmuch as future building could not change that equality, the incentive to build would be gone. The formula between Japan and the United States was that a ratio of 5—3 would result in satisfactory naval strength in Japanese waters. If you will refer to the record of the Conference you will find that the original formula proposed by this Government covered not only capital ships and aircraft carriers but also all auxiliary combatant craft, and specifically covered cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. This proposition was accepted on behalf of Japan by Baron Kato.

He said: "Gladly accepting therefore the proposal in principle Japan is ready to proceed with determination to a sweeping reduction in her naval armament."

And again he said: "Japan has never claimed nor had any intention of claiming to have a naval establishment equal to that of either the United States or the British Empire. Her existing plan will show conclusively that she had never in view preparation for offensive war."

Later the position of Japan was greatly solidified by Article 19 of the Treaty under which Japan, Great Britain and the United States undertook to maintain the status quo to military stations in Pacific waters within a large radius from Japan. The point I am emphasizing at the moment is that the net result gave Japan a naval position in the East which more than adequately protected her interests without any increase in the 5—5—3 formula. Under these circumstances it would seem that to increase Japan's ratio to 10—10—7, would in view of these restrictions on American and British defenses in Eastern Waters, tend to increase her strength beyond that which is necessary for defensive purposes.

Therefore I had considered that I should accept the statements made on behalf of Japan at the Washington Conference, in view of the circumstances attending their utterance, as a considered and final statement of naval policy largely dependent on the agreement as to bases, in the same way that the agreement as to bases is dependent on it.

After the Washington Conference, it is true, there was substantial building in the cruiser and submarine classes by various nations, and the race for armament seemed again to be forcing a needless and dangerous financial burden on the nations.

To attempt to deal with that situation the Geneva Conference was called, and if you will refer to the invitations to that Conference you will remember that it was called in an attempt to carry on the principles laid down at Washington.

The Geneva Conference failed largely because of difficulties between Great Britain and the United States, and in that Conference Japan always took the position that she desired to limit the tonnage in each class, and to put that limit down as low as other nations would agree. At that time Great Britain desired a large number of cruisers; the United States was not willing to accede.

Recently we have entered into the communications which you know about with Great Britain. In those communications and in our conferences with Mr. MacDonald we have not discussed the Japanese ratio or the Japanese position, feeling that it would not help to discuss such questions when the representatives of Japan were not present, therefore what I am now saying to you is in no wise a statement of the British position, nor am I informed whether or not the British agree with what I am saying.

The general range of our discussions with the British has been as follows:

We considered the submarine category together and found that both of us would be willing to abandon the submarine entirely. We felt doubt as to whether either Japan or France and Italy would so agree. We felt that, if submarines were not to be abolished we were willing to limit the building of them, and we expected that Japan would probably have the same idea as to submarines although we know that Japan had, built and building, a very substantial submarine tonnage, probably above any ratio of 5—5—3.

When we came to discuss the destroyer class we found that the United States was at the moment possessed of a large number of destroyers built for the purposes of the last war. We have discussed this class with Great Britain and feel that we should be glad to put the limit of this destroyer class as low as practicable, and we talked of a limitation, between 150,000 and 200,000 tons.

In respect to capital ships, the United States' suggestion was that there should be no replacements or a minimum of replacements other than those necessary to work out in 1936 the 5—5—3 ratio. That, as pointed out, would mean a large saving in money. Great Britain did not take any final position as to capital ship replacements but suggested that,

all nations should make some replacements in a smaller type of battleship perhaps 25,000 tons. We are not inclined to accord with this last suggestion as it is out of accord with our historic naval views. We have promised Great Britain to consider it and feel that it is a matter which could safely be left to the London Conference.

When we came to more difficult cruiser class our effort was to persuade Great Britain to be satisfied with what we regarded as small number of units and lower tonnage than they asked at Geneva. They finally made suggestion that they would be satisfied with about 50 units with tonnage of about 340,000 tons in 1936 (this is about their present strength), with replacement program of, say, two cruisers a year until 1936, making a total of 14 replacements. That would make their 1936 cruiser status fifteen 8-inch gun cruisers, a total of 146,000 tons, and about 192,000 tons smaller 6-inch cruisers, many of which would be old. Suggestions were made between us of some method of providing a common yard-stick for measurement which would make due allowance for greater age and inferior gun calibre of the British fleet as compared with American cruiser fleet which, Great Britain suggested should consist of 10 of our Omaha class (7,000 ton 6-inch); 18 of 10,000 8-inch class and a further number of smaller 6-inch gun cruisers to accomplish parity with Great Britain under such term as we might agree on as constituting total cruiser equality. United States naval advisers on the other hand felt that the United States should have at least 21 of the 10,000 ton 8-inch gun type to make up for the disparity in displacing tonnage. When we reached this point we thought we were near enough agreement with Britain to leave the matter safely to the conference, and in that situation the matter has been left.

(右假譯文)

貴官ハ倫敦會議ニ於テ取扱ハルヘキ數艦種ニ關スル日本ノ要求比率ニ付予ノ政策ヲ表明センコトヲ求メラレ且日本ハ巡洋艦殊ニ八吋砲裝備ノ艦船ニ付五—三ノ比率ニ非スシテ一〇—七ノ比率ヲ希望スル旨ヲ申述ヘラレタリ

貴官モ御察知ノ通今次會議ノ最大難關ノ一ハ佛伊兩國カ其ノ相互ノ間ニ於テ同一比率ヲ保持セント希望スルコトニ存スヘク從テ倫敦會議ニ於テハ「比率」ナル文字ハ甚タ面白カラサル文字ト云フコトヲ得ヘシ或ハ比率ニ依ラスシテ寧ロ艦船ノ

現實狀態ノ結果トシテ窮極的解決ヲ遂クルコト可能ナルヤモ知レズ予ハ未タ會議ノ事項ニ關シ最終的意見ニ達シ居ラス且會議ニ上ルコトアルヘキ問題ニ付何等確定セル見解ヲ持セスシテ會議ニ臨マント欲ス予ハ貴國ノ特殊問題並欲求ヲ知ランカ爲貴國代表諸氏ト親シク會合センコトヲ鶴首ス又予ハ壽府及華府ニ於テ日本代表カ米國代表ニ與ヘラレタル縮小ニ關スル有效ナル支持ヲ回想ス此ノ意味ニ於テ貴官ハ予ノ回答ヲ諒解セラルヘシ貴官ハ又予カ予ノ胸中ニ藏スルモノヲ極メテ率直ニ陳述シツツアルモノニシテ恰カモ最終的意見ヲ述ヘントスルカノ如キ慎重ナル言葉使ヒヲナスモノニ非サルコトヲ諒解セラルヘシ

予ハ日本政府カ其ノ比率ニ關スル態度ヲ變更セラレ巡洋艦種ニ於テ一〇—七ニ増率セラレタルコトハ恐ラク會議ノ成功ニ資スル所ナカルヘシト信ス予ハ率直ニ且稍詳細ニ右予ノ所信ノ理由ヲ陳述セント欲ス

華府會議ハ或ル一國ヲシテ他國ニ對シテ建造ヲ爲サシムヘキ誘因ヲ除去センカ爲海軍軍備ヲ制限セントスル試圖ナリキ競争阻止ノ目的ヲ以テ同會議ニ依リテ提議セラレタル方式ハ英國及米國ハ其ノ艦隊ヲ均勢タラシムルコトニ同意スヘキコトニアリ即チ將來ノ建造ハ右均勢ヲ變更スルコト能ハサルカ故ニ建造ノ誘因ハ除去セラルヘシト云フニアリ日本ト米國トノ間ノ方式ハ五—三ノ比率ハ日本近海ニ於テ充分ナル海軍力ヲ日本ニ與フヘシト爲スニアリ若シ貴官ニシテ同會議ノ記錄ヲ參照セラルルニ於テハ貴官ハ米國政府ノ原提案ハ主力艦及航空母艦ノミナラス一切ノ補助艦艇ヲモ包含シ特ニ巡洋艦、驅逐艦及潛水艦ヲ包含セシコトヲ見出サルヘシ右提議ハ加藤男爵カ日本ヲ代表シテ受諾セラレタル所ナリ

加藤男爵ハ「故ニ日本ハ右提案ヲ主義上受諾シ日本海軍軍備ノ大々的削減ニ着手スルノ用意アリ」ト述ヘラレタリ

同男爵ハ更ニ「日本ハ未タ曾テ英國又ハ米國ノ海軍ト均勢ノ海軍ヲ有センコトヲ主張シタルコトナク又之ヲ主張セントスルノ意思ヲ有シタルコトナシ日本ノ既定計畫ハ日本カ未タ曾テ攻擊戰爭ノ準備ヲ企圖シタルコトナキヲ明確ニ立證スヘシ」ト述ヘラレタリ

其ノ後日本ノ地位ハ華府條約第十九條ニ依リテ大ニ確保セラレタリ即チ同條ニ依リ日本、英國及米國ハ太平洋上日本ヲ中心トシテ長距離ノ行動範圍内ニ在ル要塞及海軍根據地ノ現狀維持ヲ約定セリ予ノ茲ニ力說セントスル點ハ此ノ結果ハ極東ニ於テ五―五―三ノ比率ヲ増加セストモ其ノ利益ヲ充分保護シ得ヘキ以上ノ海軍力ヲ日本ニ與ヘタルモノナルコトニアリ右ノ事情ヨリ考フレハ日本ノ比率ヲ一〇―一〇―七ニ増加スルコトハ東部海洋ニ於ケル此等英米防備ノ制限ニ鑑ミ日本ノ勢力ヲ防禦ノ目的ニ必要ナル以上ニ増加スルノ嫌アルヘシ

故ニ予ハ華府會議ニ於テ日本ヲ代表シテ爲サレタル陳述ハ右陳述ノ爲サレタル當時ノ事情ニ鑑ミ根據地ニ關スル協定カ海軍政策ニ依據スルト同様ニ海軍政策カ主トシテ根據地ニ關スル協定ニ依據スルコトヲ熟考ノ上最終的ニ陳述セラレタルモノナリト解スルモノナリ

華府會議後各國ニ依リテ巡洋艦及潛水艦ノ多大ノ建造行ハレ軍備競争ハ再ヒ各國民ニ危險ナル財政的負擔ヲ強フルノ觀ヲ呈セリ此ノ事態ニ處センカ爲壽府會議召集セラレタルカ若シ貴官ニシテ同會議招請狀ヲ參照セラルルニ於テハ貴官ハ右會議ハ華府ニ於テ規定セラレタル原則ヲ續行スルノ目的ヲ以テ召集セラレタルコトヲ記憶セラルヘシ

壽府會議ハ主トシテ英米間ノ難局ニ依リテ失敗セリ同會議ニ於テ日本ハ常ニ各艦種ノ噸數ヲ制限シ他ノ諸國カ合意シ得ヘキ最低限度迄右制限ヲ低下センコトヲ欲スル旨主張セリ其際英國ハ巡洋艦ノ多數ヲ要求シ米國ハ之ニ同意スルノ意ナカリキ

最近吾人ハ貴官御了知ノ如ク英國ト交渉ニ入レリ右交渉並「マクドナルド」氏トノ會談ニ於テ吾人ハ日本ノ比率又ハ日本ノ地位ヲ討議セルコトナシ蓋シ吾人ハ日本ノ代表者ノ列席セサル際右ノ如キ問題ノ討議ヲナスモ益ナシト信シタレハナリ故ニ今予ノ貴官ニ述ヘントスル所ハ決シテ英國ノ立場ニ非ス又予ハ英國カ予ノ言ハントスル所ニ果シテ同意スルヤ否ヤヲ知ラサルナリ

吾人ノ英國トノ討議ノ一般範圍ハ次ノ如シ

吾人ハ潛水艦種ニ考慮ヲ加ヘ双方共潛水艦ノ全廢ヲナスノ用意ヲ有スルコトヲ明カニシタルカ日本又ハ佛伊カ右ニ同意スルヤニ付疑ヲ感セリ又若シ潛水艦ニシテ全廢セラレストハ吾人ハ其ノ建造ヲ制限スルノ意圖ヲ有スルコトヲ明カニシ尙日本カ既成及建造中ノモノヲ合シ五―五―三ノ比率ヨリ恐ラク遙ニ大ナル潛水艦ヲ有スルコトヲ承知セルモ右制限ニ付テハ日本モ同様ノ意圖ヲ有セサルヘシト期待シタリ

驅逐艦種ノ討議ニ當リ吾人ハ米國カ世界大戰ノ目的ノ爲建造セラレタル多數ノ驅逐艦ヲ有スルコトヲ注意セリ吾人ハ英國ト本艦種ヲ討議シ驅逐艦種ヲ實際上出來得ル限り制限スヘク十五萬噸乃至二十萬噸ノ間ニ於テ右制限ニ關シ意見ヲ交換セリ

主力艦ニ關シ米國ハ一九三六年ニ於テ五―五―三ノ比率トナスニ必要ナル代換以外ニハ何等代換ヲ行ハサルカ又ハ最小限ノ代換ヲ行フニ止ムヘキコトヲ提議シ右ハ多大ノ節約ヲ意味スヘキヲ指摘セリ英國ハ主力艦代換ニ關シ何等最終的主張ヲナサザリシカ各國民ハ二萬五千噸程度ノ小型戰艦ニ依リ若干ノ代換ヲナスヘシト提議セリ吾人ハ右最後ノ提議ハ吾人ノ海軍ニ關スル歴史の見解ト合致セサルヲ以テ之ニ同意スルノ意ナシ吾人ハ英國ニ右ヲ考慮スヘキコトヲ約シタルモ右ハ倫敦會議迄未解決ノ儘殘サルルモ差支ナキ問題ナリト思惟ス一層困難ナル巡洋艦問題ノ討議ニ當リテハ吾人ハ英國ヲ説服シ英國カ壽府ニ於テ要求セル隻數及噸數ヨリ少ク且低キモノト吾人ノ考フル點ニテ英國ヲ満足セシメント努力セリ英國ハ遂ニ一九三六年迄ニ毎年二隻宛總計十四隻ノ代換ヲナス計畫ニテ同年ニ於テ約三十四萬噸五十隻（是レ殆ント英國ノ現在勢力ナリ）ノ勢力ヲ以テ満足スヘキコトヲ提議セリ右ハ英國ノ一九三六年ニ於ケル勢力ヲ八吋砲巡洋艦十五隻總噸數十四萬六千噸及小型六吋砲巡洋艦十九萬二千噸（右ノ中多數ハ老齡艦ナリ）トナスモノナリ英國艦隊ヲ米國巡洋艦艦隊ニ比較シ英國側ニ老齡艦多ク又劣勢ノ大砲ヲ有スル艦船多キヲ以テ之カ調節ヲ計ル爲共通ノ尺度ヲ作成スル方法ヲ講スヘシトノ提議アリタリ右米國艦隊ハ英國側ノ提議ニヨレハ「オマハ」級（七千噸六吋）十隻、一萬噸八吋級十八隻及小型六吋砲巡洋艦數隻ニシテ右ハ英米ノ巡洋艦勢力ヲ同等ナラシムルモノトシテ吾人カ合意シ得ヘキ條件ノ下ニ英國トノ均勢ヲ成就スル



モノナリ然レトモ一方ニ於テ米國海軍顧問ハ米國ハ噸數ニ於ケル不平等ヲ調節スル爲少クトモ二十一隻ノ一萬噸八吋砲巡洋艦ヲ有セサルヘカラスト信ス此ノ點ニ達シタル時吾人ハ英國トノ間ニ於テハ最早ヤ協定ニ近ツキタルモノニシテ右ノ點ヲ會議迄未決トスルモ安全ナリト信シ且右事情ノ下ニ同問題ヲ未決ノ儘殘シタリ

## (2) 昭和四年十二月十七日、日米全權第一回會談議事録

昭和四年十二月十七日若槻財部兩全權國務長官ヲ會見ノ際通譯ノ任ニ當リタル齋藤部長ハ會談要領ヲ書留メシヨ通譯シタル處最後ニ國務長官ヨリ心宛ニ迄右筆記ノ要領ヲ「ミニッツ」ニ作り交付ヲ得タキ旨申出テ我方ニ於テ之ニ同意ヲ與ヘ次テ十九日第二回會見ニ於テ齋藤部長ハ其ノ心組ニテ會談要領ヲ筆記シ居リタル處途中ニ至リ國務長官ハ之ヨリ申述アル所ハ自分ノ極メテ重要視スル點ナレハ齋藤部長「ミニッツ」作製ヲ援助スル意味合ニテ自分ノ秘書官「スミス」(倫敦ニ隨行シ)ニヨリ筆記セシメ度シトテ同人ヲ呼入レ最後迄會談ヲ速記セシメ第二回會談「ミニッツ」ハ便宜上同官ニ於テ作成スルモノナリナレ

*Strictly Confidential.*  
LNC-JAIC-No. 1.

Revised

### DRAFT MINUTES OF THE INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE DELEGATES TO THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE.

(By H. Saito).

Present:

Mr. Reijiro Wakatsuki,  
Member of the House of Peers,  
Delegate.

Admiral Takeshi Takarabe,  
Minister of the Navy,  
Delegate.

Mr. Hiroei Saito,  
Secretary.

Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State,  
Delegate.

Mr. Dwight W. Morrow,  
Ambassador to Mexico,  
Delegate.

Mr. Wm. R. Castle, Jr.,  
Special Ambassador  
to Japan.

Both delegations met at "Woodley," Mr. Stimson's private residence, at 3 o'clock, p.m., Tuesday, December 17, 1929.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that he wished to express his opinion in the frankest manner. As had been repeatedly avowed, at home and abroad, Japan desired most earnestly the success of the London Conference and hoped that the agreement would not only be a limitation but an actual reduction in naval armaments. As to the ratio Japan desired to hold, Ambassador Debuchi had, he understood, often submitted it to his (Mr. Stimson's) consideration under instructions from the Japanese Government, and he thought that it was already known to the American delegation.

Japan had always made it the fundamental principle of her national armament to hold such strength as would not disturb the sense of national security of the people; in other words, a strength insufficient for attack and adequate for defense. The ratio of 70% of the largest naval strength was calculated from the necessity for defense purposes in the adjacent waters of Japan, and it was a point to which Japan desired to obtain an agreement from all powers concerned. It was, therefore, his sincere hope that the Secretary of State would give sympathetic consideration to this matter. He was given to understand that some time ago the Secretary of State had proposed to Ambassador Debuchi to contrive to find some means of solving the question by taking into consideration the actual conditions. Japan would, of course, be glad to accede to that desire, but his Government rather lacked information as to the basis upon which to construct such a plan as desired by the Secretary of State, not having been advised of the details of the provisional arrangement between the United States and the British Government especially in regard to the large sized cruisers. If, therefore, the Secretary of State would be good enough to give such information to him he would consider it very useful.

Mr. STIMSON replied that he wished to be frank in his statement of his views just as was Mr. Wakatsuki and just as he had always been in his negotiations with Ambassador Debuchi. He was clearly desirous that the London Conference should be a success.

As to the first point of Mr. Wakatsuki's questions, namely, the question of provisional Anglo-American agreement with especial reference to 10,000 ton cruisers, there existed no agreement except what he had told Ambassador Debuchi some time ago. The American Government demanded 21 such cruisers on the recommendation of naval advisers,

while the British Government thought that the United States ought to be satisfied with 18 ships. The American Government had thought that that was a near enough agreement to enable the two countries to go to London with every hope of success. The difference of three ships could somehow be adjusted in other categories of auxiliary craft. However, he had as yet no figures of adjustment.

As to the larger ratio which formed another point in Mr. Wakatsuki's queries he would reply giving the result of his careful thought, his consultation with his colleagues, and his survey of the minds of the people. He considered the Government ought to represent such opinion as the people would think just and right.

As to the Washington Conference which brought about the fundamental condition of things that led to the convening of the forthcoming Conference in London, the American people had a feeling that this country had been very generous and made the greatest sacrifice of all in order that an agreement could be reached among the participating Powers. In 1921 America had the largest navy in the world, but she was ready to give up that position and, moreover, to pledge herself to maintain the status quo of the fortification in the Philippine Islands and other Pacific possessions in order to facilitate disarmament by removing the sense of rivalry, jealousy, and competition, and particularly to relieve Japan from any anxiety as to her national security. He thought that Mr. Wakatsuki recognized, and he had often heard from Mr. Debuchi, that the feelings between America and Japan had been much improved. That was due, in his mind, greatly to the successful outcome of the Washington Conference. The American people believed in good faith that that agreement could only have been reached by the United States giving up more than half of her naval strength and by consenting to the maintaining of the status quo of fortifications in her possessions in the vicinity of Japan. The basic spirit of the Washington Conference was to bring about a period of confidence among nations and to avoid competition in armaments. However, in point of fact, for the past seven or eight years there appeared, it was much to be regretted, fresh competition of naval construction in regard to the classes of ships not covered by the Washington treaties. There was therefore abroad a feeling that that conference had not altogether been a success. America had not been party to that competition in the beginning, but after the failure of the Geneva Conference, she felt constrained to take to naval building once again. That was shown by an act of Congress authorizing the construction of twenty-three 10,000 ton cruisers. Mr. Debuchi would remember that that act was peremptory, which meant that the President must

build unless some international agreement as to disarmament could be arrived at. Moreover, the American navy formulated a big navy plan involving an enormous expenditure to build the other classes of ships that might be necessary to make up fleets with these 10,000 ton cruisers. He had explained that to Mr. Wakatsuki to show him that the American people attached great importance to the necessity of catching up with the navies of the other Powers unless some agreement of disarmament could be concluded.

Such being the case, when he was asked by Mr. Dehuchi as to the opinion of the United States in regard to the desire of Japan to hold a higher ratio in cruisers than in capital ships, he had replied in all frankness that that would give a bad impression to the American people and would not conduce to the success of the Conference. He would have thought that a great many Americans would feel such change to be unfair to themselves.

Further, as to battleships, the American people still felt strongly that they were the center of naval strength. They never considered a battleship fleet as obsolete. It was true that the United States was willing to try to find a way to reduce the strength of that class of war craft. She knew also that that was Japan's wish. On his way from Manila to Washington he had touched at Tokyo and on that occasion he had heard personally from Admiral Okada, Admiral Takarabe's predecessor, that Japan wished such reduction and that, if an agreement could not be reached among nations on that point, they had to face the necessity of starting their expensive replacement. However, the United States would not feel it to be in her interest, if Japan would reduce the battleship fleet in which the ratio 5-5-3 had already been agreed upon and would turn the financial balance thus saved to the building of cruisers in which Japan was asking for a ratio of 10-10-7. His position was, therefore, that he hoped that the question of ratio would not be raised by Japan. It was clear that the United States did not seek to impose a position of inferiority on any nation, to force any nation to sign an agreement which was repugnant to its sense of honor or pride. He wished that that point would be well understood. He had told Ambassador Dehuchi, therefore, that they would rather discuss matters at the Conference, giving careful consideration to the actual conditions of the situation, and without referring to the question of ratio. What he had had in mind was this, that he had hoped that what Japan had actually been doing in regard to her cruiser strength might be considered and that in some way in the light of what had been done, they might find a basis for an understanding or an agreement. He had, therefore, been a little disappointed when he learned

that Japan had increased her cruiser strength from 206,000 tons to 226,000 tons. He would rather make the subject of discussion the actual strength of 206,000 tons than any figures calculated merely on account of the ratio. So his opinion had been that if Japan would keep her needs down to the actual necessity for defense, America would be willing to try to persuade other nations to come to an agreement. She would herself try to meet her on the same principle. They could have worked out an arrangement which would be honorable to all concerned and give hurt to no Power. Great Britain had already shown her willingness to reduce her cruiser strength lower than what she had proposed in 1927. The American navy was also ready to consent to holding a strength smaller than that of Great Britain. Moreover, if the latter came down, America would go down even further.

All he could promise now was to give the utmost sympathy and fair consideration to the Japanese claim.

Mr. WAKATSUKI thanked Mr. Stimson for listening so carefully to what he had stated and was much gratified that the latter was willing to give sympathetic consideration to the Japanese attitude. Mr. Stimson was good enough to explain the feelings of the American people in the frankest manner, and he would likewise state Japan's sentiments with candor. He did not think it would avail much to dwell upon past history, but according to his views it was a fact that the Japanese people had a feeling of having been pressed to accept the form of disarmament as stipulated at the time of the Washington Conference. He would refrain from criticising the results of that Conference, but Japan had claimed from the beginning seventy per cent. and the people deeply regretted that that claim had not been accepted. By explaining on the part of the Government the benefit of maintaining the status quo of fortifications in the Pacific, some portion of the people had been conciliated but the general feeling of regret could not have been wiped away. It was generally thought that at a future disarmament conference seventy per cent. should strongly be put forward as to the classes of ships not covered by the Washington Conference. This had become a national conviction. It was true that America exercised self-restraint in agreeing to maintain the status quo of fortifications in the Pacific, but, for that matter, Japan also agreed to maintain the status quo of fortifications of her own islands. Mr. Stimson had referred to the sacrifice America had made in scrapping many warships, but Japan, on her part, also had made a great sacrifice in kind. Therefore, it was Japan's national desire that at the forthcoming Conference in London she should claim seventy per cent., lacking which the sense of national security would surely be disturbed. As to the ratio of 5-5-3 agreed upon

at the Washington Conference regarding capital ships, that was already definite and he had no idea of re-opening that question. However, as to other categories of ships not covered by the Washington Conference, it was a fact that no agreement whatever had been completed at that time. It had only been agreed upon that the size of cruisers should be limited to 10,000 tons—a type which did not exist at that time. Later the number of cruisers carrying 10,000 tons had gradually come into existence and developments had been effected in other instruments of war, and the general situation had been greatly changed since the time the Washington treaties were concluded. From this point of view he thought it would not be adequate to make the ratio of the Washington treaties as the basis upon which to argue disarmament today. He wished that that point would be well understood.

As to capital ships, Japan had never thought that they were obsolete, but she considered them still to constitute the center of armament, Japan thought that in order to meet the necessity of naval reduction it would be advisable to prolong the age-limit, reduce the type, lengthen the period of replacement, and so on, of this class of warships. However, Japan was claiming such reduction in the sense that it was not Japan alone that would profit by it, but all nations concerned at the same time. He (Mr. Wakatsuki) was not arguing with Mr. Stimson but, from the point of view just put forward, it would be clear that Japan had no thought of utilizing the financial balance saved by reducing the capital ship strength for augmenting the cruiser tonnage. He was not saying that just on the spur of the moment, but he believed that that was the conviction of the Japanese people.

Further, he would not object to studying the matter as Mr. Stimson had suggested, from the point of view of actual conditions without reference to the question of the ratio. But he was given to understand that between the United States and Great Britain the principle of parity had first been decided upon and concrete figures were taken into consideration as an application of that principle. Japan had proposed to have an agreement as to the ratio first in the sense that some standard had better be adopted as in the case of the Anglo-American arrangement. He thought that it would not be inadvisable to approach actual conditions and concrete figures keeping the ratio always in mind. If, therefore, the Secretary of State would give him time he would be glad to submit for his consideration a plan conceived in that sense.

Mr. Wakatsuki said that he was sorry that he had not been answering Mr. Stimson's questions seriously but

would now refer to the Secretary's disappointment in regard to the figures of 206,000 tons which represented Japan's present cruiser strength and those of 226,000 tons which she now seemed to have proposed. He supposed that the former figures had been obtained by an addition of 108,400 tons and about 60,000 tons representing Japan's present strength in 8-inch gun cruisers and cruisers of lesser types\*, respectively. The difference of 20,000 tons in the two tonnages was, as the Secretary thought, calculated on the basis of the seventy per cent. ratio. Therefore, the tonnage he spoke of would of its nature come down as the tonnage to be held by the superior navies would come down. The figures stood high simply because the superior navies seemed to claim high figures.

Mr. Stimson desired to be shown Japan's concrete plan.

Mr. Wakatsuki said that he would, in that case, submit his plan for the Secretary's consideration. On the supposition that America was going to hold 18 8-inch 10,000 ton cruisers, Japan would desire to possess a certain number of 10,000 ton cruisers and a certain number of cruisers with less than 10,000 tons, aggregating 126,000 tons distributed among 13 ships. But this represented the eventual figures and in the transitory period, namely, pending the replacements of the Furutaka class cruisers, Japan desired to hold 14 ships consisting of the existing 8 10,000 ton cruisers, 4 Furutaka class cruisers with 7,100 tons each, and 2 more ships, with a tonnage of less than 10,000. Apparently the number might sound too large, but when the real strength was studied, the fleet contained 4 Furutaka class ships and 2 cruisers with the tonnage of less than 10,000 tons, and accordingly very much inferior to a fleet consisting of cruisers with a uniform tonnage of 10,000.

Now as to the submarines. They were the most useful and adequate weapon of defense for a country like Japan consisting of islands widely scattered on the sea and holding an inferior naval strength. The Japanese navy did not think that the submarine strength now existing and being built in Japan would be sufficient for the defense of the country, but in view of the fact that the disarmament conference was now going to be held and a reduction would be effected all round, Japan would be content to hold nothing more than her present existing strength of 78,500 tons. He wished to make it clear, however, that Japan was not demanding anything like parity with other nations. She would have no objection if other Powers held ten-sevenths of her submarine strength.

\* Mr. Wakatsuki was referring to ships of less than 20 years of age.

With regard to lesser type cruisers and destroyers, Japan stood ready to effect reduction according as the other Powers concerned decreased their holdings.

What he had just stated was the Japanese plan conceived upon the consideration of the actual conditions, and he wished the Secretary would give his careful thought to it. He would be glad if the Secretary would disclose his frank opinion as to its merits.

Mr. Stimson thought that it was of great value that such unreserved and frank opinions were exchanged. He felt that the plan just shown him was the same as that which he had heard from Mr. Debutch some time ago. But he was willing to give it further consideration if it was so desired. If it was Mr. Wakatsuki's wish, he would see him again before he left, or he might see him in London, or, if somebody in the Japanese Delegation would confer with some of the American advisers, that would be equally agreeable to him. In general, however, it might be preferable not to discuss only the question of 10,000 ton cruisers but to take other categories of ships into consideration at the same time. If the discussion was centered in the 10,000 ton cruisers alone, it would be quite difficult, to his mind, to arrive at an agreement which would be satisfactory to the American people. They could not but entertain the feeling that the amount of 226,000 tons meant, on the one hand, the increase of the Japanese naval strength, and, on the other, a reduction of the American naval strength. He would not be able to show that such feeling was wrong. But he was not going to close the door to the Japanese proposal. He would be glad to continue discussions.

Mr. Wakatsuki appreciated the courtesy of Secretary Stimson in having given him so much time when he was ill. He wished to continue conversations either here or at London. In any case, he thought it very essential that some agreement should be arrived at as to those questions previously to the opening of the Conference. Therefore, he would like the Secretary to continue to discuss them with Ambassador Debutch after his departure and, further, if it was considered by the Secretary profitable to have discussions among experts he would be glad to appoint somebody in the delegation to take up the duty.

After deciding upon the joint statement for the press (annex), the meeting adjourned at 5.30 o'clock p.m. until 10 a.m. Thursday, December 19, 1929.

#### ANNEX.

Reijiro Wakatsuki, chief delegate; Admiral Takeshi Takarabe, delegate; Japanese Ambassador Debutch and Hiroshi Saio, secretary, visited the Secretary of State at his house this afternoon. The Secretary had with him Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow and Ambassador William R. Castle, Jr.

There was a frank and friendly discussion of the underlying problems of the two countries which affect the issues of the conference.

Both Mr. Wakatsuki and Secretary Stimson expressed optimistic hope for the successful termination of the conference and the increase of good will between the two countries which a solution of the naval problems helps maintain.

(3) 昭和四年十二月十九日 日米全權第二回會談議事錄

本議事錄作爲日本及日米全權會議事務之記錄

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON.

December 19, 1929.

Dear Mr. Saito:

By direction of the Secretary of State, I send you, herewith, a copy of the Minutes of the informal meeting between the Japanese and American Delegates, held in the Secretary of State's office on Thursday, December 19, 1929.

With best wishes for a pleasant voyage, I am,

Sincerely yours,

William H. Beck,

Assistant to the Secretary.

Mr. H. Saito,

Secretary of the Japanese Delegation,

c/o Japanese Consulate General,

165 Broadway,

New York City.

MINUTES OF THE INFORMAL MEETING BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN DELEGATES,  
HELD IN THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1929, AT 10:20. (by W. H. Beck)

Present: Mr. R. Wakatsuki.

Admiral T. Takabe.

Ambassador Debuchi.

Mr. H. Saito.

The Secretary of State.

Ambassador Morrow.

Ambassador Castle.

Admiral Jones.

Mr. Wakatsuki started by saying that yesterday the President was good enough to give them a magnificent dinner in their honor and he considered it not so much as tendered to themselves as to the Japanese nation. Moreover the President was good enough to give him time to talk about matters pertaining to the mission with which he was entrusted. On that occasion Mr. Wakatsuki discussed with the President the substance of the conversations at Woodley on the previous day.

Mr. Wakatsuki then asked the Secretary for his opinion or comment on the matters which he had discussed with him day before yesterday.

The Secretary said that he would be very glad to do so; that Mr. Wakatsuki had invited frankness and candor; that the limitations of his voice, being so hoarse, compelled him to be brief, but he wanted His Excellency to understand that he started from this idea, namely, that he attached the highest importance to the good feeling between this country and Japan produced by the agreements of the Washington Conference. The Secretary said that he was speaking from the standpoint of an observer in this country. He said that Mr. Wakatsuki remembered the difficult situation existing before that conference and the irritated feeling which existed; that now as Ambassador Debuchi frequently commented, such difficulties and irritations have passed and a feeling of friendliness and confidence has taken their place that is principally due to the Washington Conference. The Secretary said he knew that this friendly feeling existed in this country and that knowledge made him enter this conference anxious that nothing would change or diminish it, and that he would answer His Excellency's questions from that point of view.

The Secretary stated that, as he said the other day, he does not presume to pass upon the different needs of Japan; that they are a matter for her Government to decide. The Secretary stated that he did not arrogate himself or

put himself in the position in the slightest degree of giving suggestions to Japan in the matter of her national defense, but as Mr. Wakatsuki had asked questions based on figures relating to Japanese naval strength, he could tell him with a great deal of confidence that those figures would cause anxiety in American public mind.

In the first place, the Secretary stated that he knew that the Executive of this country, which is the branch of our Government which is seeking reductions, would be most disappointed. The Secretary said that he knew that the President would be disappointed because he knows—as we all know—that these figures presented would result in a feeling among our people and in our Congress, that we must build much higher than we hoped we would have to build. The Secretary said that as His Excellency knows, Mr. Hoover, our President, is most earnestly seeking reduction. The President is in touch with public opinion and he and the Secretary and all who also are in touch with public opinion realize that the American people would feel that this country with its immensely long coastline on two oceans, separated by the Isthmus of Panama, would have normally to require a much larger defensive force than a nation situated like Japan in a compact group of islands, and that the American people would demand, if they heard that the ratio was being increased and Japan was seeking larger figures for her fleet, that instead of reduction they should likewise increase.

The Secretary said that he appreciated the considerations which His Excellency mentioned about the public feeling in Japan, and that he had earnestly hoped that we should be able at the Conference to find a way by which the natural feelings of the Japanese people could be protected, and that their national sensibilities should not in any way be offended by anything like an attempt to impose upon them or by anything approaching an invasion of their own sovereignty or by putting them in any position of inferiority to other nations.

The Secretary said that with his colleagues and advisers he was now earnestly studying ways to reach such a result after they got to London when he could confer with His Excellency again on that subject.

The Secretary said that it was for that reason that he suggested to Ambassador Debuchi some weeks ago and he renewed the suggestion now, that it would be well in his opinion not to discuss figures or ratios in the press because they simply aroused opposite feelings in each country, and would make more difficult the task of finding a solution which will be satisfactory to both countries, and which will not offend the national sensibilities of either one.

The Secretary said that speaking in the confidence of the group present, as His Excellency had invited him to do, and taking up the questions he asked, he was obliged to say that he feared the American people, and the American Congress would regard a cruiser tonnage of 226,000 tons for Japan as so high that it would necessitate counter-building on the part of America.

The Secretary said he had reflected very carefully on this and had consulted with his colleagues, who are members of Congress, and he felt very clearly that he was not in error in saying that.

The Secretary then said that His Excellency had asked him about submarines. The Secretary said that the American Government, as His Excellency knew, is very strongly opposed to the use of submarines for destroying commerce and that the American Government was very glad that it was joined by Japan in the Washington Conference in the Treaty which unfortunately was not ratified by all of the other nations, which forbade their use indiscriminately for destroying commerce. The Secretary stated that the American Government thinks that the uses of submarines apart from commerce destroying, are comparatively limited, and the American Government feels that the danger of too great a reliance upon submarines, and too large a construction of submarines, is that it creates a temptation to use them against merchant ships under conditions where they can not obey the rules of war.

The American Government recognizes that other nations may differ from it in their opinion as to the usefulness of submarines in legitimate warfare, and may think them more useful than we do, but it is our hope that at least the construction of submarines shall be restricted so as to avoid their use against merchant commerce in the inhuman way which excited so much reprobation during the Great War. The Secretary said that it has been the hope that at this Conference we might successfully reaffirm the humane principles of the 1922 Treaty on the subject of commerce destroying submarines.

The Secretary said that these views in regard to submarines which he had stated he thought were held by a large part of the American people and he thought that the figures which His Excellency suggested on Tuesday for Japan, of 80,000 tons of submarines, would be thought by the American people to be so high that they would feel that they would excite great temptation for the use of such submarines in commerce destroying. The Secretary said that he was speaking only of the way he felt that our people would look at it, and he feared therefore that if Japan should

insist on such a large construction it would tend to lessen that good feeling about which he spoke in the beginning of the conversation; that it would excite again a demand by our people and our Congress for the construction of a large force of anti-submarine craft like destroyers and light cruisers. The Secretary added that now that he had spoken his views very frankly and with great candor, as His Excellency had invited, he could only repeat that he did so from a sincere desire to have this Conference a success and because he feared that a demand for these figures might endanger the success of the Conference. The Secretary said that he had tried to bear in mind the viewpoint of the Japanese people and he begged His Excellency to remember also the viewpoint of the American people who are situated between two oceans with an enormous coastline which they regard as vulnerable in war, and who think that they have a very great need for naval defense. The Secretary said this was all he thought he could say on this situation, except to say again that he would meet His Excellency in London with an open mind and with the utmost friendly desire not to do anything which will offend the feelings of Japan, and to do everything to try to make this Conference a success. By success the Secretary said he meant to make the Conference further promote friendliness between the two people.

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Mr. Wakatsuki said that he had listened with great interest to the Secretary's very frank views as to the feelings of the American people, and of the American Congress; that at the same time he was glad that the Secretary had understood very well the aspirations and the feelings of the Japanese people; that he did not think that it would add very much if he repeated the same things, but he said that the Japanese people are content to hold the inferior naval strength compared with the other powers, and that they have in mind only the maintenance of national security; therefore it had never entered their minds that the Japanese Navy would ever excite the feelings of other powers. Mr. Wakatsuki said that the Secretary had been good enough to comment upon what he said the other day, referring to the figures he gave as to the cruisers and submarines. As to the cruiser tonnage, as Mr. Wakatsuki said the other day, it is a relative question; if other powers came down in their strength Japan's figures would naturally decrease. As to submarines, Mr. Wakatsuki said that Japan will be most willing to have a treaty such as the Secretary had referred to in the Treaty of 1922, forbidding illegal use of that class of warcraft at the forthcoming conference.

Mr. Wakatsuki said that as he had told the Secretary the other day, Japan's desire for retaining submarines is not in the least predicated upon the thought of destroying commerce, but from the necessity of possessing a weapon of

défense, in view of the fact that she is to have inferior naval strength. Mr. Wakatsuki said that he had referred to these points at their previous meeting; however, if both our Governments consult experts on these points they will become very much clearer.

Mr. Wakatsuki said that as to the good feelings existing between our two peoples, to which the Secretary had referred, he was entirely in accord; that it would be very important to maintain them; that while Japan has to give great consideration to the feelings of the American people, he, Mr. Wakatsuki, has to take into consideration the feelings of the Japanese because they are exercising self-restraint and are contemplating no aggression against other countries, and therefore in case the ratio they are demanding is not recognized at the Conference he wished the Secretary to understand how high the feelings may run in Japan in that connection.

Mr. Wakatsuki said that he did not think that it is a question of the increase of ratio, but the most important thing was that the balance or equilibrium of naval powers should always be good; that if this question is decided upon even in a general way previous to the opening of the Conference itself the discussions at the Conference would be made very much easier. Therefore Mr. Wakatsuki said after their departure he wished the conversations might be continued between the Secretary and Ambassador Debuchi. Further, that before the opening of the Conference in London they might have time to talk together again. Mr. Wakatsuki thanked the Secretary for his very friendly and candid talk and he shared the Secretary's views that good results should be attained at the forthcoming Conference so that in the future he would seek occasions to further submit his views to the Secretary's consideration.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Wakatsuki for his suggestion. He said that he would try to reach London several days before the Conference opened and he hoped to see him then before it opened. The Secretary said that he would also be glad to talk with Ambassador Debuchi in the meanwhile. The Secretary stated that he felt very hopeful after these talks with Mr. Wakatsuki and said that he felt with this spirit they would be able to work out the form of an arrangement which would give offense to neither country and which would be a satisfactory solution of the question of naval defense.

Mr. Wakatsuki said that he wished to say that he would be most happy to give consideration to any suggestions the Secretary might make in the future.



After the exchange of mutual farewells the conversations ended at 11:45.

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(参 考 文)

"The discussion, like that at Woodley, was concerned with the general philosophy underlying naval agreements and the opportunities of the coming conference. It took up the good results between the United States and Japan of the Washington conference and the possibilities of continuing and increasing these results.

The agreement in the objectives of both countries was established. Then in a very frank and friendly way each delegation presented the broad outlines of its position. This discussion did not go into details or figures, which is the province of the conference and should be done there where all the participating nations will be represented."

(4) 昭和四年十二月十七日及十九日、日米全權會談ニ關スル覺書

右覺書ハ昭和四年十二月二十七日米國國務省ヨリ在米出陣大使ニ送付シ來リタルモノニシテ右二  
回ノ會談ノ要領ヲ簡記セタルナリ

*Strictly Confidential.*

MEMORANDUM.

During the stay in Washington of the Japanese Delegates to the London Naval Conference, they attended two meetings with the American Delegates to the Conference on Tuesday December 17 and Thursday December 19, 1929, respectively.

At these meetings the Chairman of the Japanese Delegation, the Honorable Reijiro Wakatsuki and the Chairman of the American Delegation, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson presented their points of view on certain questions affecting Japan and the United States.

Mr. Wakatsuki after emphasizing Japan's great desire for the success of the London Conference and an actual reduction of naval armaments explained that Japan had always made it the fundamental principle of her national armament to hold such strength as would not disturb the sense of national security of her people. In other words, a strength insufficient for attack and adequate for defense. Japan desired to obtain agreement from all Powers concerned to her having a ratio of 70 per cent. of the largest naval strength as being that necessary for defense purposes in the adjacent waters of Japan. Mr. Wakatsuki said that he understood that the Secretary of State had proposed to Ambassador Debnuchi to contrive to find some means of solving this question by taking into consideration the actual condition. He then asked for information upon which to construct such a plan. He desired particularly to be informed as to the details regarding the provisional understanding between the United States and the British Government in regard to large sized cruisers.

Mr. Stimson replied to express his great desire for the success of the London Conference and to set forth his view frankly.

On the question of 10,000 ton cruisers, he said there existed no agreement except what he had told Ambassador Debuchi some time ago. The American Government demanded 21 such cruisers on the recommendation of its naval advisers while the British Government thought that the United States should be satisfied with 18 ships. The American Government thought that that was near enough to an agreement to enable the two countries to go to London with every hope of success. The difference of three ships could somehow be adjusted. However, as, yet he had no figures of adjustment.

As to the larger ratio suggested by Mr. Valkanski, he said he would reply, giving the result of his careful thought after his consultation with his colleagues and his survey of the minds of the people. He considered the Government ought to represent such opinion as the people would think just and right.

Mr. Stimson then referred to the Washington Conference which brought about the situation that led the convening of the Conference at London. He said the American people felt that this country had been very generous and made great sacrifices in order that an agreement might be reached. America in 1921 had the largest navy program in the world but was ready to give up that position and, moreover, to pledge herself to maintain the status quo of the fortification in the Philippine Islands and her other Pacific possessions in order to facilitate disarmament by removing the sense of rivalry, jealousy and competition and particularly to relieve Japan of any anxiety as to her national security. He referred to the improved good feelings between America and Japan resulting from the successful outcome of the Washington Conference. The American people believed in good faith that that agreement could only have been reached by the United States giving up a very large portion of her naval strength and consenting to maintenance of the status quo of fortifications in her possession in the vicinity of Japan.

Mr. Stimson commented on the regrettable renewal in the last seven or eight years of competition of naval construction in the classes of ships not covered by the Washington Treaties. There was therefore a feeling that that Conference had not altogether been a success. America had not been party to that competition in the beginning but after the failure of the Geneva Conference felt constrained to take to naval building once again, as was shown by the Acts of Congress authorizing the construction of 23 10,000 ton cruisers. The last Act was peremptory which meant that the President must build unless some international agreement as to disarmament could be arrived at. Moreover, the American

navy had formulated a big plan involving an enormous expenditure to build the other classes of ships that might be necessary to complete the American fleet. He explained that in order to show the importance which the American people attached to the necessity of catching up with the navies of the other Powers unless some agreement of disarmament could be concluded.

Such being the case when asked by Mr. Debuchi as to the opinion of the United States in regard to the desire of Japan to hold a higher ratio in cruisers than in capital ships, he had replied frankly that that would give a bad impression to the American people and would not conduce to the success of the Conference. A great many Americans would feel such a change to be unfair to themselves.

The American people, the Secretary continued, strongly felt that battleships were the center of naval strength. They had never considered a battleship fleet as obsolete. However, the United States was willing to try to find a way to reduce the strength of that class. He knew also that that was Japan's wish. The United States, however, would not feel it in her interest if Japan reduced the battleship fleet in which the ratio of 5-5-3 had already been agreed upon and turned the moneys thus saved to the building of cruisers in which Japan was asking for a ratio of 10-10-7. The United States did not seek to impose a position of inferiority on any nation. He had told Ambassador Debuchi therefore that they would rather discuss matters at the Conference giving careful consideration to the actual conditions of the situation without referring to the question of ratio. He hoped that a basis for an understanding or agreement might be found in the light of what Japan had actually been doing in regard to her cruiser strength.

He had therefore been very disappointed to learn that Japan had recently increased her proposed cruiser strength from 206,000 tons to 226,000 tons. He would rather make the subject of discussion the actual strength of 206,000 tons than any figures calculated merely on account of the ratio. He could not but feel that the American people would regard the high figures with serious misgivings and that as a result it might demand a corresponding increase in the American cruiser program.

So his opinion had been that if Japan would keep her needs down to the actual existing strength, America would be willing to try to meet her on the same principle and to persuade other nations to come to an agreement. Great Britain had already shown her willingness to reduce her cruiser strength lower than what she had proposed in 1927 and if the

latter came down, America would go down even further. All he could promise now was to give the utmost sympathy and fair consideration to the Japanese claim.

Mr. Wakatsuki was gratified that Mr. Stimson was willing to give sympathetic consideration to the Japanese attitude. The Japanese people had a feeling that they had been pressed to accept the form of disarmament stipulated at the time of the Washington Conference. Without criticizing the results of that Conference, he mentioned that Japan had claimed from the beginning a ratio of 70 per cent. and the people deeply regretted that that claim had not been accepted. The Government explanation of the benefit of maintaining the status quo of fortification in the Pacific had conciliated some portion of the people but the general feeling of regret had not been wiped away. Public opinion favored 70 per cent. being put forward strongly at a further disarmament conference for the class of ships not covered by the Washington Conference. This had been a national conviction. He pointed out that Japan had agreed also to maintain the status quo of fortifications of her own islands. Japan had also made sacrifices by scrapping warships. At anything short of 70 per cent., Japan's sense of national security would be disturbed. He had no idea of reopening the 5-5-3 ratio agreed upon at the Washington Conference as to capital ships. However, as to other categories of ships not covered by the Washington Conference no agreement whatever had been completed at that Conference. It had only been agreed upon that the size of cruisers should be limited to 10,000 tons,—a size which did not exist at that time. Subsequently a number of cruisers of 10,000 tons had gradually come into existence, developments had been effected in other instruments of war and the general situation had been greatly changed since the time the Washington Treaties were concluded. Therefore, he thought it would not be adequate to make the ratio of the Washington Treaties the basis upon which to argue disarmament today.

As to capital ships, Japan had never thought that they were obsolete. They still constituted the center of armament. Japan thought that in order to meet the necessity of naval reduction it would be advisable to prolong the age, reduce the size, lengthen the period of replacements, and so on, of this class of warships. It was the Japanese feeling that it was not Japan alone that would profit by it, but all nations concerned at the same time. Japan had no thought of utilizing the moneys saved by reducing the capital ship strength for augmenting the cruiser tonnage. This he was saying just not on the spur of the moment, but he believed that it was the conviction of the Japanese people.

He would not object to studying the matter as Mr. Stimson had suggested from the point of view of actual conditions and without reference to the question of ratio. However, he was given to understand that between the United States and Great Britain the principle of parity had first been decided upon and the concrete figures taken into consideration as an application of that principle. Japan had proposed to have an agreement on the ratio first, in the sense that some standard had better be adopted as in the case of the Anglo-American arrangement. He thought that it would not be inadvisable to approach actual conditions and concrete figures, keeping the ratio always in mind. Later, he would be glad to submit for Mr. Stimson's consideration a plan conceived in that sense.

Mr. Wakatsuki referred to Mr. Stimson's disappointment in regard to the figures of 206,000 tons and 226,000 tons which Japan now proposed as cruiser strength.

The difference of 20,000 tons was calculated on the basis of the 70 per cent. ratio. Therefore this suppositive tonnage might come down as tonnage to be held by the superior navies would come down. The figures stood high simply because the superior navies seemed to claim high figures. Mr. Wakatsuki said in reply to an inquiry from Mr. Stimson that he would submit his plan for consideration. If America were going to hold 18 8-inch-gun 10,000 ton cruisers, Japan would desire to possess a certain number of 10,000 ton cruisers and a certain number of cruisers of less than 10,000 tons aggregating 126,000 tons distributed among 13 ships. This represented the eventual figures but in the transitory period pending the replacements of the Furutaka class cruisers, Japan desired to hold fourteen ships consisting of the eight 10,000 ton cruisers, four Furutaka class cruisers with 7,100 tons each, and two more ships with a tonnage of less than 10,000 tons. This he considered very much inferior to a fleet consisting of cruisers with a uniform tonnage of 10,000 tons.

Mr. Wakatsuki referred to submarines, and their adequacy as weapons of defense for a country like Japan consisting of islands widely scattered on the sea and holding an inferior naval strength. Japan would be content to hold nothing more than her present strength of 78,500 tons. She would have no objection if other Powers held ten-sevenths of her submarine strength.

With regard to small cruisers and destroyers, Japan stood ready to effect reduction according as the other Powers concerned decreased their holdings.

Mr. Stimson thought that it might be preferable not to discuss only the question of 10,000 ton cruisers but to take other categories of ships into consideration at the same time. He felt that if the discussion centered on 10,000 ton cruisers alone it would be quite difficult to arrive at an agreement satisfactory to the American people. It could not but feel that the amount of 226,000 tons meant that Japan desired an increase of her naval strength on one hand and demanded a reduction of American naval strength on the other.

At this point the meeting adjourned to December 19th.

Mr. Stimson referred to the good feeling existing between Japan and the United States largely as a result of the confidence which had been set up after the Washington Conference, and said that this knowledge made him enter this Conference anxious that nothing would change or diminish this feeling.

He thought that the figures relating to Japanese naval strength mentioned by Mr. Wakatsuki would cause anxiety in the American public mind. The President who is seeking reduction would be most disappointed. The President and all those who are also in touch with public opinion realize that the American people would feel that this country with its immensely long coast line on two oceans, separated by the Isthmus of Panama, would normally require a much larger defensive force than a nation situated like Japan in a compact group of islands.

Mr. Stimson said he hoped that they would be able at the Conference to find a way by which the national feeling of the Japanese people could be protected and their national sensibilities not in any way offended by anything like an attempt to impose upon them or put them in a position of inferiority to other nations.

After again stating that the American people and Congress would regard a cruiser tonnage of 226,000 tons for Japan as so high that it would necessitate counter building on the part of America, Mr. Stimson referred to the matter of submarines. He said that the American Government is very strongly opposed to the use of submarines for destroying commerce and was very glad that it was joined by Japan in the Washington Conference Treaty (unfortunately not ratified by all of the other nations) which forbade their use indiscriminately for destroying commerce.

Mr. Stimson said he felt that the danger of too great a reliance on submarines, and too large a construction of submarines, the uses of which are comparatively limited apart from commerce destroying, is that it creates a temptation to use them against merchant ships under conditions where they cannot obey the rules of war. He recognized that other

nations might differ in their opinion as to the usefulness of submarines in warfare, but hoped that at least the construction of submarines might be restricted so as to avoid their use against merchant commerce in the inhuman manner which had been used in the past. Mr. Stimson said that he hoped that this Conference might successfully reaffirm the humane principles of the 1922 Treaty on the subject of commerce destroying submarines.

Mr. Stimson feared that the nearly 80,000 tons of submarines suggested for Japan by Mr. Wakatsuki would be thought by the American people to be unduly high and he feared that such large construction might tend to lessen the good feeling of which he had already spoken, and might excite a demand in America for the construction of a large force of anti-submarine craft like destroyers and light cruisers.

Mr. Wakatsuki in reply said that the Japanese people have in mind only the maintenance of national security and therefore it had never entered their mind that the Japanese Navy might ever excite the mistrust of other Powers. He again said that cruiser tonnage is a relative question and that if other Powers came down in their strength, Japanese figures would naturally decrease. He also said that Japan would be most willing to conclude a treaty at the forthcoming Conference such as the kind referred to in the Treaty of 1922 forbidding illegal use of submarines.

Mr. Wakatsuki, with reference to the use of submarines as a weapon of defense, suggested that if both Governments consulted experts in the matter it would eventually become very much clearer.

Mr. Stimson and Mr. Wakatsuki both expressed their gratification of the very friendly and frank nature of the conversations and considered that a very considerable progress had been made in the direction of a mutual understanding.

Department of State,

Washington.

December 26, 1929.

(5) 「マシヤナルド」ト帝國全權トノ第一回會見日取(昭和五年一月  
九日)通知ノ「シレーギ」書翰

Foreign Office, S. W. 1.  
8th January, 1930.

My dear Monsieur Saito,

As promised I send you below the confirmation of the arrangements suggested for the Prime Minister's reception of the Japanese delegates.

The Prime Minister will be very pleased to see Monsieur Wakatsuki, Admiral Takarabe, Monsieur Matsudaira and yourself at No. 10 Downing Street at 5.0. p.m. to-morrow, Thursday, the 9th.

On Saturday, the 11th, he is looking forward to seeing at luncheon at Chequers, Monsieur Wakatsuki, Admiral and Madame Takarabe, Monsieur and Madame Matsudaira and yourself.

Chequers is 38 miles from London and near Aylesbury. I should think it would take about an hour and a half to motor down, and I would suggest that you arrive about 12.30 or a quarter to one, if that is convenient to the delegates.

Believe me,  
Yours sincerely,  
(Sgd.) R. L. Craigie

Monsieur Hiroshi Saito.

.....

January 8th, 1930.

My dear Mr. Craigie,

Thank you very much for your note just received confirming what you were good enough to tell me about the Prime Minister's intention to receive the Japanese Delegates. We will come to No. 10, Downing Street and Chequers at the hours suggested.

With thanks, believe me,  
Yours sincerely,  
Sgd. Hiroshi Saito.

R. L. Craigie, Esq., C. M. G.,  
Foreign Office,  
Downing Street,  
London.

(6) 昭和五年一月九日、日英全權會見ノ際我全權ヨリ「マクドナルド」  
ニ手交セル巡洋艦比率ニ關スル覺書

*Strictly confidential.*

Japanese Delegation  
to the  
London Naval Conference,  
46 Grosvenor Square, W.

THE NUMERICAL RELATIONS OF JAPAN'S CLAIM IN  
RESPECT OF THE CRUISER STRENGTH

What Japan desires to hold is the minimum naval strength sufficient to eliminate menace to her national safety. She purposes no aggression; she only wishes that security should be ensured her in the adjacent waters of the country. This is a fact, clearly evidenced by her readiness to possess a naval strength inferior to that of the British Empire or of the United States.

It appears, however, that His Britannic Majesty's Government do not see their way to accepting the Japanese claim in the light of the particular phase of the question that the strength Japan proposes to hold in the 8-inch gun or large type cruisers would approximate the British strength in that category.

The Japanese point of view in this connection will be submitted in detail in the following paragraphs.

1. It is an unavoidable fact that the strength which Japan proposes to possess in the large type cruisers would be more than 70 per cent. of the holdings of the British Navy, as a result of Japan's desire to possess 70 per cent. of the American strength in that category.

But, on the other hand, computing on the hypothesis that the American cruiser strength will stand at 315,500 tons, comprising 180,000 tons for the large type cruisers and 135,500 tons for the small type, i. e. 6-or-less-than-6-inch-gun cruisers, the Japanese share for the small type cruisers at 70 per cent. would be 94,850

tons. Comparing these figures with the British allotment in that class of ships, standing at 192,200 tons, the Japanese holdings would register only 49 per cent.

(The hypothetical figures above referred to are those of what is understood to be the Anglo-American provisional agreement, which, it is the earnest wish of Japan, will still be reduced so that the Japanese figures may accordingly be lowered. It may be added, moreover, that while Japan desires to own 70 per cent. in the auxiliary craft as a whole, the cruiser strength only has been considered in the above calculation for the sake of simplicity.)

Such is a natural conclusion arising from the circumstances that, on the one hand, the British Empire is in a special position to lay emphasis upon the small type of cruisers and, upon the basis of the Anglo-American parity, would be satisfied with a strength smaller than the American holdings in ships of the large type class, and on the other, Japan is so circumstanced as to attach great importance to the large type cruisers.

2. Further, when the large type and small type cruisers are taken together, as was undoubtedly the case when the principle of parity was applied to the British and American navies, the Japanese holdings in the gross cruiser strength would constitute only 65 per cent. of that of Great Britain.

3. Moreover, when close examination is made into the actual strength of the Japanese holdings as proposed, its intrinsic inferiority will become apparent as described in the following items:

(a) Japan's claim in respect of 8-inch gun cruisers is fourteen ships in the transitory period, and eventually thirteen. This claim is based upon the assumption that the United States is to possess 18 cruisers of the 10,000 ton class or a total tonnage of 180,000. And since the total tonnage of the thirteen 8-inch gun cruisers which Japan purposes eventually to possess will not exceed 126,000 tons, her holdings in the 10,000 ton cruisers will not exceed eleven in number. As regards the transitory period, Japan would hold eight 10,000 ton cruisers and four cruisers of the Furutaka class which are of an old type and of inferior strength, comparable to the Hawkins class. And even if she were to hold in addition two 8-inch gun cruisers of the 8,800 ton type, these latter being comparable to the York class, the

strength in 8-inch gun cruisers which Japan would thus possess would be far inferior to that of Great Britain.

(b) Japan's holdings in small cruisers, as has already been set forth, will be far inferior to that of Great Britain. The British and American navies, moreover, are to build many new ships for the coming years while Japan will be forced to retain many old-type ships for several years to come.

It is therefore apparent that the inferiority of the Japanese strength in the cruisers will be more pronounced during the transitory period, so much so that some arrangement will have to be sought to meet the situation.

For the reasons given above, Japan cannot subscribe to the idea of examining the large type cruisers separately and independently as a means of comparing holding strengths. In order to reach a just and fair conclusion, she deems it essential that the large and small type cruisers be considered together and their actual strength scrupulously examined.

(7) 昭和五年二月五日「リー」ヨリ若槻全權ニ手交セル

米國全權部試案

SECRET

TENTATIVE PLAN OF  
THE AMERICAN DELEGATION  
5 FEBRUARY 1930

I.

CRUISERS.

FOR UNITED STATES.

<u>Total Tons</u>	<u>Type</u>
180,000- 18 10,000-ton cruisers carrying guns of 8" caliber.	
70,500- 10 existing OMAHA's.	
76,500- New cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6" caliber.	
327,000	
(a) The United States shall have the option of the following:—	
150,000- 15 10,000-ton cruisers carrying guns of 8" caliber.	
70,500- 10 existing OMAHA's.	
118,500- New cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6" caliber.	
339,000	

FOR GREAT BRITAIN

11-110,000- 11- 10,000-ton cruisers now completed carrying 8" guns.

- 2- 20,000- 2- 10,000-ton cruisers now building carrying 8" guns.
- 2- 16,800- 2- 8,400-ton cruisers now building carrying 8" guns.
- 14- 91,000- New cruisers mounting 6" guns.
- 21-101,200- Existing cruisers mounting 6" guns.
- 50-339,000

(a) Great Britain may retain four cruisers of Hawkins class carrying 7.5" guns until replacement by 6" cruisers. To be replaced by 1934-5.

(b) Great Britain shall have the option of the following:—

- 176,800- 18- 10,000-ton (or smaller) cruisers carrying guns of 8" caliber.
- 75,000 new } Cruisers carrying guns of 6" caliber.
- 75,200 existing }
- 327,000

FOR JAPAN

Total Tons	Type
4- 28,400-	4- 7,100-ton cruisers carrying 8" guns.
4- 40,000-	4- 10,000-ton cruisers now completed carrying 8" guns.
4- 40,000-	4- 10,000-ton cruisers now building carrying 8" guns.
17- 81,455-	Cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6" caliber.
8,800-	Existing or new cruisers carrying guns not exceeding 6".
198,655	

REPLACEMENTS

- 1. No cruiser may be replaced until it shall have reached a life of twenty years from date of completion, unless it shall have been lost through an accident.

- 2. Tonnes are given in Washington standard tons.
- 3. Old tonnage may be retained over the age limit if not replaced, but the right of replacement is not lost by delay in scrapping after reaching the age limit.

DESTROYERS

Total tonnage of destroyers and destroyer leaders shall be.

For United States	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	200,000
For Great Britain	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	200,000
For Japan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	120,000

- 1. Existing destroyers and leaders may be retained and vessels building may be completed up to the above total allowed tonnages.
- 2. Existing vessels shall not be scrapped except to comply with the allowed tonnage until the vessel has reached an age limit of 16 years.
- 3. Old tonnage may be retained over the age limit if not replaced, but the right of replacement is not lost by delay in scrapping after reaching the age limit.
- 4. No new vessels shall be laid down prior to 31 December 1936, except to replace vessels reaching the age limit or lost through accident.
- 5. Maximum unit displacements shall be limited as may be agreed upon in Conference. We suggest 1,850 tons for United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and 3,000 tons for France and Italy.

SUBMARINES. (if Retained).

Total tonnage of submarines shall be:—

For United States	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	60,000
For Great Britain	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	60,000
For Japan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	40,000



1. Existing submarines may be retained and vessels building may be completed up to the above total allowed tonnage.
2. Existing vessels shall not be scrapped except to comply with the allowed tonnage until the vessel has reached an age limit of 13 years.
3. No new vessels shall be laid down prior to 31 December 1936, except to replace vessels reaching the age limit or lost through accident.
4. Submarine tonnages are given in Geneva standard tons, surface condition.
5. Maximum unit displacement shall be limited as may be agreed upon in Conference.
6. Old tonnage may be retained over the age limit if not replaced, but the right of replacement is not lost by delay in scrapping after reaching the age limit.
7. Submarines to be limited to the same rules of international law as surface craft, in operations against merchant ships.

#### BATTLESHIPS.

1. The replacement tables of the Washington Treaty are modified as follows to comply with these principles:—
  - (a) Immediate scrapping of old ships down to a total of 15-15-9.
  - (b) No new ships to be laid down prior to 31 December 1936, except as provided below in paragraph 4.
  - (c) Each nation may retain two old battleships for training purposes or for use as targets provided these vessels shall be rendered incapable of further warlike service as prescribed in the Washington Treaty.
2. Tonnages are in Washington standard tons. Three thousand standard tons have been added to each of the IDAHO, MISSISSIPPI, and NEW MEXICO to allow for future modernization.
3. Should any provision be made for replacements of battleships, each nation may retain old tonnage if not replaced, and the right of replacement of that tonnage is not lost by such postponement.
4. In order to realize now the parity of battleship tonnage which was ultimately contemplated by the Washington treaty by balancing the RODNEY and NELSON, the United States may lay down one 35,000-ton battleship in 1933,

complete it in 1936, and on completion scrap the WYOMING. If the United States shall exercise this option, then a similar option as to replacing one capital ship shall be granted to Japan.

5. "Modernizing" existing ships includes increase in gun elevation.
6. The foregoing principles will result in a schedule substantially as follows:

#### FOR UNITED STATES.

1. Scrap FLORIDA .. .. .	Standard	21,900
UTAH .. .. .		22,000
ARKANSAS .. .. .		26,100
Total .. .. .		70,000
2. Total tons now on hand .. .. .		532,400
Scrap in 1930-31 .. .. .		70,000
Remaining 1 January 1936 .. .. .		462,400
Scrap WYOMING in 1936 .. .. .		26,000
		436,400
1 new ship .. .. .		35,000
		471,400

#### FOR GREAT BRITAIN

1. Scrap IRON DUKE... .. .	Standard	26,250
MARLBOROUGH... .. .		26,250
EMPEROR OF INDIA .. .. .		26,250

[illegible]

FOR JAPAN.

	Standard
1. Scrap KONGO ... ..	26,330
2. Total tons now on hand ... ..	292,400
Scrap in 1930-31 ... ..	26,330
Remaining until 31st December, 1936 ... ..	266,070

## AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

The minimum limitation of 10,000 tons shall be stricken from the definition of aircraft carriers in the Washington treaty, so that all such vessels shall be charged against the permitted tonnage.

**EXEMPT CLASS.**

- (a) That all naval surface combatant vessels of less than 500 tons standard displacement be exempt.
- (b) That all naval surface combatant vessels of 500 to 3,000 tons individual standard displacement should be exempt from limitation, provided they have none of the following characteristics:—
  - (1) Mount a gun greater than 5-inch caliber
  - (2) Mount more than two guns above 3-inch caliber.

- (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.
- (4) Are designed for a speed greater than 16.5 knots.
- (5) That all naval vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed in fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way other than as fighting ships, should be exempt from limitation provided they have none of the following characteristics:—
  - (1) Mount a gun greater than 6-inch caliber.
  - (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch caliber.
  - (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.
  - (4) Are designed for a speed greater than 16.5 knots.
  - (5) Are armoured.
  - (6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines.
  - (7) Are fitted to receive planes on board from the air.
  - (8) Mount more than one aeroplane-launching apparatus on the center line; or two, one on each broadside.
- (d) Certain existing vessels of special type to be exempted by mutual agreement.

米		國		巡洋艦	
總噸數	一八〇,〇〇〇	總噸數	一八〇,〇〇〇	隻數	一八
	七〇,五〇〇		一〇		
				艦型	八吋砲搭載一萬噸巡洋艦 現有「オマハ」型

總計	七六、五〇〇	六吋ヲ超エサル砲ヲ搭載スル新巡洋艦
(イ) 米國ハ左ノ「オブション」ヲ有ス	三二七、〇〇〇	
	一五〇、〇〇〇	一五 八吋砲ヲ搭載スル一萬噸巡洋艦
	七〇、五〇〇	一〇 現有「オマハ」型
總計	一一八、五〇〇	六吋ヲ超エサル砲ヲ搭載スル新巡洋艦
	三三九、〇〇〇	

(註) 本項(イ)ニ對スル(ロ)ナシ右ハ米國側ノ誤ナルベキモ此處ニハ原文ニ忠實ニ譯シ置キタリ

英國

總計	總噸數	隻數	艦型
	一一〇、〇〇〇	一一	既成八吋砲搭載一萬噸巡洋艦
	二〇、〇〇〇	二	建造中ノ八吋砲搭載一萬噸巡洋艦
	一六、八〇〇	二	建造中ノ八吋砲搭載八千四百噸型巡洋艦
	九一、〇〇〇	一四	六吋砲ヲ搭載スル新巡洋艦
	一〇一、二〇〇	二一	六吋砲ヲ搭載スル現有巡洋艦
總計	三三九、〇〇〇	五〇	

(イ) 英國ハ六吋砲巡洋艦ニ依テ代換セラルルニ至ル迄七吋半砲ヲ搭載スル「ホーキンス」型四隻ノ巡洋艦ヲ保有スルコトヲ得、一九三四年乃至五年迄ニ代換ノコト  
(ロ) 英ハ左ノ「オブション」ヲ有ス

總計	總噸數	隻數	艦型
	一七六、八〇〇	一八	八吋砲ヲ搭載スル一萬噸(又ハ一萬噸未満ノ)巡洋艦
	七五、〇〇〇		六吋砲ヲ搭載スル新巡洋艦
	七五、二〇〇		六吋砲ヲ搭載スル現有巡洋艦
總計	三三七、〇〇〇		
日本			

總計	總噸數	隻數	艦型
	二八、四〇〇	四	八吋砲搭載七千噸巡洋艦
	四〇、〇〇〇	四	現ニ竣工ノ八吋砲搭載一萬噸巡洋艦
	四〇、〇〇〇	四	建造中ノ八吋砲搭載一萬噸巡洋艦
	八一、四五五	一七	六吋ヲ超エサル砲ヲ搭載スル巡洋艦
	八、八〇〇		六吋ヲ超エサル砲ヲ搭載スル現有若クハ新巡洋艦
總計	一九八、六五五		
代換			

- 一、巡洋艦ハ竣工ノ日ヨリ二十年ノ艦齡ニ達スル迄代換スルコトヲ得但シ事故ニ依リ亡失セル場合ハ此限リニ在ラス
- 二、噸數ハ華府基準噸ニ依ル
- 三、代換セサル場合ニハ艦齡超過ノ舊噸數ヲ保有スルコトヲ得但シ代換ノ權利ハ艦齡滿限後廢棄遲延ノ爲喪失スルコトナシ

驅逐艦

驅逐艦及嚮導驅逐艦ノ總噸數左ノ如シ

米	國	110,000
英	國	110,000
日	本	110,000

- 一、前記許容噸數ニ達スル迄現存驅逐艦及嚮導驅逐艦ヲ保有シ及建造中ノモノハ之ヲ完成スルヲ得
- 二、許容噸數ニ一致セシムル場合ヲ除クノ外現有艦艇ハ艦齡十六年ニ達スル迄之ヲ廢棄セサルヘシ
- 三、代換セサル場合ニハ艦齡超過ノ舊噸數ヲ保有スルコトヲ得但シ代換ノ權利ハ艦齡滿限後ノ廢棄遲延ノ爲喪失スルコトナシ

- 四、艦齡滿限又ハ事故ノ爲亡失セル艦艇ヲ代換スル場合ヲ除クノ外一九三六年十二月三十一日以前ニハ新艦ヲ起工セサルヘシ

- 五、單艦ノ最大排水量ハ會議ノ協定ニ依リ之ヲ定ム

吾人ハ米英日ニ付テハ一、八五〇噸佛伊ニ付テハ三、〇〇〇噸ヲ提議ス

潛水艦（存置ノ場合）

潛水艦ノ總噸數ハ左ノ如シ

米	國	60,000
英	國	60,000
日	本	40,000

- 一、前記許容噸數ニ達スル迄現有潛水艦ヲ保有シ及建造中ノモノハ之ヲ完成スルコトヲ得
- 二、許容噸數ニ一致セシムル場合ヲ除クノ外現有艦艇ハ艦齡十三年ニ達スル迄之ヲ廢棄セサルヘシ
- 三、艦齡滿限又ハ事故ノ爲亡失セル艦艇ヲ代換スル場合ヲ除クノ外一九三六年十二月三十一日以前ニハ新艦ヲ起工セサルヘシ

- 四、潛水艦ノ噸數ハ壽府基準噸 (Surface Condition) ニ依ル

- 五、單艦ノ最大排水量ハ會議ノ協定ニ依リ之ヲ定ム

- 六、代換セサル場合ニハ艦齡超過ノ舊噸數ヲ保有スルコトヲ得但シ代換ノ權利ハ艦齡滿限後ノ廢棄遲延ノ爲喪失スルコトナシ

- 七、潛水艦ハ商船ニ對スル行動ニ付水上艦ト同一ノ國際法規ニ從フヘキモノトス

#### 主 力 艦

- 一、華府條約代換表ハ次ノ原則ニ依リ左ノ通修正ス

(イ) 一五、一五、九ノ總計ニ達スル迄舊艦ヲ直ニ廢棄スルコト

(ロ) 左記第四項ニ掲クル場合ヲ除クノ外一九三六年十二月三十一日以前ニハ新艦ヲ起工セサルコト

(ハ) 各國ハ練習又ハ標的用トシテ二隻ノ舊艦ヲ保有シ得ルコト但シ右舊艦ハ華府條約ノ規定ニ從ヒ戰闘用ニ供シ得サル

狀態ニ置クコトヲ要ス

- 二、噸數ハ華府基準噸ニ依ル「アイダホ」「ミシシピ」及「ニュー、メキシコ」ノ各艦ニハ將來ノ改裝ヲ可能ナラシムル爲三千基準噸ヲ加ヘタリ

- 三、主力艦代換ノ爲何等規定ヲ設クルニ於テハ各國ハ代換セサル場合ニハ舊噸數ヲ保有シ得ヘク該噸數代換ノ權利ハ右延期ニ依リ喪失スルコトナシ

- 四、「ロードニー」及「ネルソン」トノ均衡ヲ圖ルコトニ依リ華府條約ノ考慮スル主力艦噸數ノ究極ノ均勢ヲ今日實現セムカ爲米國ハ三萬五千噸戰艦一隻ヲ千九百三十三年ニ起工シ千九百三十六年ニ之ヲ竣工スルヲ得ヘク右竣工ノ上ハ「ワイオミング」ヲ廢棄ス米國カ右「オブション」ヲ行使スル場合ニハ日本ハ主力艦一隻代換ニ關シ同様ノ「オブション」ヲ有スヘシ

五、現有艦改装ニハ仰角増大ヲ含ムモノトス  
六、以上ノ原則ハ實質上左ノ結果ヲ生ス

米 國

一、廢 棄 基準噸

「フロリダ」 二一、九〇〇

「エタ」 二二、〇〇〇

「アーカンソー」 二六、一〇〇

計 七〇、〇〇〇

二、現有總噸數 五三二、四〇〇

一九三〇年乃至三二年廢棄 七〇、〇〇〇

一九三六年一月一日現存勢力 四六二、四〇〇

一九三六年ニ「ワイオミング」廢棄 二六、〇〇〇

差 引 四三六、四〇〇

新艦一隻 三五、〇〇〇

計 四七一、四〇〇

英 國

一、廢 棄 二六、二五〇

「アイアン、デューク」 二六、二五〇

「マールバラ」 二六、二五〇

「エムペラ、オブ、インディア」 二六、二五〇

「ベンボ」 二六、二五〇

「タイガー」 二八、九〇〇

計 一三三、九〇〇

二、現有總噸數 六〇六、四五〇

一九三〇年乃至三二年廢棄 一三三、九〇〇

一九三六年十二月三十一日迄ノ殘存勢力 四七二、五五〇

日 本

一、廢 棄 二六、三三〇

金 剛 二九二、四〇〇

二、現有總噸數 二六、三三〇

一九三〇年乃至三二年廢棄 二六、三三〇

一九三六年十二月三十一日迄ノ殘存勢力 二六六、〇七〇

航 空 母 艦

華府條約航空母艦定義ヨリ最小制限一萬噸ヲ削除シ以テ此種艦艇ハ總テ該許容噸數中ニ算入スヘシ

制 限 外 艦 艇

一、基準排水量五百噸未満ノ戰闘用水上艦艇ハ總テ之ヲ制限外トス

二、單艦基準排水量五百噸以上三千噸以下ノ戰闘用水上艦艇ニシテ左記性能ノ何レヲモ有セサルモノニ限リ總テ之ヲ制限外トス

- (イ) 口徑五吋ヲ超ユル砲ヲ搭載スルコト
- (ロ) 口徑三吋ヲ超ユル砲二門ヲ超エ搭載スルコト
- (ハ) 魚雷發射ノ計畫又ハ裝置ヲ有スルコト
- (ニ) 計畫速力十六節半ヲ超ユルコト
- 三、特ニ戰鬪用艦艇トシテ建造セラレタルニ非ス又ハ戰鬪用ノ目的ノ爲平時政府ノ管理下ニアラサル一切ノ艦船ニシテ艦隊任務ニ服シ若クハ軍隊輸送船トシテ使用セラレ又ハ戰鬪用以外ノ他ノ用途ニ使用セラルルモノハ左ノ性能ノ何レヲモ有セサルモノニ限リ之ヲ制限外トスヘキコト
- (イ) 口徑六吋ヲ超ユル砲ヲ搭載スルコト
- (ロ) 口徑三吋ヲ超ユル砲四門ヲ超ヘ搭載スルコト
- 魚雷發射ノ計畫又ハ裝置ヲ有スルコト
- (ハ) 計畫速力十六節半ヲ超ユルコト
- (ニ) 裝甲ヲ有スルコト
- (ホ) 機雷投下ノ計畫又ハ裝置ヲ有スルコト
- (ヘ) 飛行機着艦裝置ヲ有スルコト
- (ト) 飛行機發進裝置ハ中央線ナラハ一基舷側ナラハ各一基宛即チ合計二基ヲ超ユルコト
- (チ) 四、特別「タイプ」ノ現有艦艇ノ或ルモノハ相互ノ協定ニ依リ之ヲ制限外トスルコト

(8) 米國全權部試案ニ關スル誤報打消ノ昭和五年二月五

日米國全權部發電信寫

本電信寫ハ昭和五年二月五日米國全權「リード」カ若槻全權ヲ來訪シタル際手交セルモノナリ

CABLEGRAM.

(Via Commercial)

February 5, 1930.

12:15 p. m.

To Sec. State—Washington.

Following for immediate delivery to Senators Swanson and Hale from Senators Robinson and Reed—  
Newspaper publications purporting to give details of contemplated arrangement wholly misleading and inaccurate.

## (9) 昭和五年二月十二日松平全權ヨリ「リープ」ニ手交サル帝國試案

*Confidential.*

## JAPANESE PROPOSAL IN REGARD TO THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

I. *Capital Ships.*

- 1) No capital ships shall be laid down before the end of 1936.
- 2) Agreement shall be reached as to the limitation of the type and gun calibre of capital ships.
  - a) The maximum displacement to be not less than 25,000 tons and the maximum gun calibre not less than 14".
  - b) The replacement age to be extended to no longer than 26 years in case of the new ships to be built in replacement of the old ships; agreement to be reached as to the time when replacement shall begin and the period in which replacement shall be completed in case of ships already existing.
  - c) The existing schedule for replacement shall be revised with a view to postponing by some years the time when replacement shall commence and further, to prolonging by some years the period in which replacement shall be completed.
  - d) There shall be no change in the numbers of vessels stipulated in the Washington Treaty.

II. *Aircraft Carriers.*

- 1) The 10,000 ton limit shall be deleted from the definition of the aircraft carriers in the Washington Treaty so as to include within the allocated tonnage all ships in that category irrespective of their displacements.
- 2) Age limit:
 

Ships of more than 10,000 tons	...	...	...	...	...	26 years,
Ships of less than 10,000 tons	...	...	...	...	...	20 years.

III. *Auxiliary Craft.*

Taking into consideration the figures contained in the American tentative proposal, the following table has been prepared:

## (1) IN CASE BOTH AMERICA AND GREAT BRITAIN HOLD 16 8-inch GUN CRUISERS.

TYPE OF VESSEL	AMERICA	GREAT BRITAIN	JAPAN
8-inch Gun Cruisers	Built, building and projected 16 ..... 150,000		Built and building 12 ..... 108,400
Light cruisers (6-inch gun or smaller)	OMAHA Class 10 ..... 70,500 New Cruisers ..... 118,500		From among those now possessed 17 ..... 81,455 New Cruisers ..... 26,300
<u>TOTAL</u>	339,000		216,155
Destroyers	150,000		105,000
Submarines	81,000		77,900
AUXILIARY CRAFT TOTAL	570,000		399,055

N.B. (a) If the United States of America fix the amount of submarines at 60,000, her amount of destroyers may be changed to 171,000.

(b) The method of replacement of auxiliary craft, limitation of type, etc., shall be discussed later.

(2) IN CASE AMERICA (OR GREAT BRITAIN) HOLD 18 8-inch GUN CRUISERS.

TYPE OF VESSEL	AMERICA	GREAT BRITAIN	JAPAN
8-inch Gun Cruisers.	Built, building and projected 18 ..... 180,000		Built and building 12 ..... 108,400 New Cruisers 2 ..... 17,600
Light Cruisers (6-inch guns or smaller)	OMAHA Class 10 ..... 70,500 New Cruisers ..... 76,500		81,700
<u>TOTAL</u>	327,000		207,700
Destroyers	150,000		105,000
Submarines	81,000		77,900
AUXILIARY CRAFT TOTAL	558,000		390,600

N.B. (a) If the United States of America fix the amount of submarines at 60,000, her amount of destroyers may be changed to 171,000.

(b) The method of replacement of auxiliary craft, limitation of type, etc., shall be discussed later.

IV. In view of the spirit in which the Five Power Conference has been convened, it is considered essential that, in the final settlement of figures, the positions of all Powers concerned should be borne in mind.

.....

(右邦文)

一、主 力 艦

- (イ) 一九三五年末前ニハ主力艦ヲ起工セサルコトトス
- (ロ) 主力艦艦型、備砲及艦齡等ニ關スル制限ノ協定ヲ遂クルコト
- (1) 艦型ハ二萬五千噸迄備砲口徑ハ十四吋迄ノ範圍内トス
- (2) 代換艦齡ハ將來舊艦ノ代換トシテ建造セラルヘキ新艦ニ對シテハ二十六年迄ノ範圍ニ於テ延長シ既成艦ニ付テハ代換開始期代換期間ニ關聯シテ之ヲ協定ス
- (3) 華府條約ニ規定スル現代換表ハ代換開始期ノ延期及代換期間ノ伸長ニ伴ヒ改訂セラルヘキモノトス
- (4) 華府條約ニ規定セラレタル隻數ハ變更セサルモノトス

二、航 空 母 艦

- (イ) 華府條約ノ航空母艦ノ定義中ヨリ一萬噸ノ制限ヲ削除シテ此ノ種艦船ハ排水量ノ如何ニ拘ラス全部同條約ノ航空母艦制限量中ニ含マシムルコトトス

(ロ) 艦 齡

一萬噸ヲ超ユルモノ 艦齡二十六年  
一萬噸以下ノモノ 艦齡二十年

三、補 助 艦

- 次ノ表ハ米國假提案中ノ數字ヲ參照シ作製セリ
- (イ) 八吋砲巡洋艦米、英共二十五隻ヲ保有スル場合



艦種	米	英	日
八吋砲巡洋艦	既成建造中及計畫 一五—一五〇、〇〇〇	既成及建造中 一二—一〇八、四〇〇	
輕巡洋艦 (六吋砲以下)	「オマハ」級 一〇—七〇、五〇〇	現有輕巡ノ内 一七—八一、四五五	
計	新巡洋艦一八、五〇〇 三三九、〇〇〇	新巡洋艦 二六、三〇〇 二一六、一五五	
驅逐艦	一五〇、〇〇〇	一〇五、〇〇〇	
潛水艦	八一、〇〇〇	七七、九〇〇	
補助艦總計	五七〇、〇〇〇	三九九、〇五五	
註(1)但シ米國カ潛水艦ヲ六〇、〇〇〇トスルトキハ驅逐艦チ一七一、〇〇〇トナスコトヲ得 (2)補助艦ノ代換方法艦型制限等ハ後日ニ協議セラルヘシ			
(ロ)			
八吋砲巡洋艦	米	英	日
艦種			
八吋砲巡洋艦	既成建造中及計畫 一八—一八〇、〇〇〇	既成及建造中 一二—一〇八、四〇〇	
輕巡洋艦 (六吋砲以下)	「オマハ」級 一〇—七〇、五〇〇 新巡洋艦 七六、五〇〇 三二七、〇〇〇	新巡洋艦 二—一七、六〇〇 八一、七〇〇 二〇七、七〇〇	
計			

艦種	米	英	日
驅逐艦	一五〇、〇〇〇	一〇五、〇〇〇	
潛水艦	八一、〇〇〇	七七、九〇〇	
補助艦總計	五五八、〇〇〇	三九〇、六〇〇	

註(1)但シ米國カ潛水艦ヲ六〇、〇〇〇トスルトキハ驅逐艦チ一七一、〇〇〇トナスコトヲ得  
(2)補助艦ノ代換方法、艦型制限等ハ後日ニ協議セラルヘシ

四、五國會議招請ノ主旨ニ鑑ミ數量ヲ協定スルニ當リテハ五國全部ノ立場ニ關シ充分考慮セラルルヲ要ス

(10) 帝國試案ノ訂正ニ關スル昭和五年二月十三日附「リード」宛  
松平全權書翰(同上返翰)及「クレーギ」宛齋藤部長書翰

13th February, 1930.

My dear Senator Reed,

With reference to the copies of the Japanese Proposal in regard to limitation of naval armaments which I had the pleasure of handing you yesterday afternoon, I wish you kindly to see your way to correcting typographical mistakes.

The item (1) under the head of "Capital Ships" should read

(1) No capital ship shall be laid down before the end of 1935,  
instead of

(1) No capital ships shall be laid down before the end of 1936.

With high esteem,

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) T. Matsudaira.

The Honourable Senator David Reed,  
American Delegation.

February 13, 1930.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this morning, making a typographical correction in the Japanese proposal, which you handed me yesterday afternoon.

I have called the attention of each member of our Delegation to this correction.

With cordial regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

D. A. Reed.

Hon. Tameo Matsudaira,  
Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain,  
46 Grosvenor Square,  
London.

February 13th 1930.

My dear Mr. Craigie,

We have found a typographical mistake in the Japanese proposal, a few copies of which I handed you yesterday afternoon at the House of Commons and some other copies of which, as I told you, were given to Senator Reed by Ambassador Matsudaira. I told the Prime Minister about it when I had the occasion to meet him at luncheon today at 10, Downing Street.

Please change Item 1 under the heading of "Capital Ships" to read as follows:—

"No capital ship shall be laid down before the end of 1935."  
instead of:—

"No capital ships shall be laid down before the end of 1936."

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed): Hiroei Saito.

R. L. Craigie Esq, C. M. G.

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(11) 昭和五年四月二日、日英米全權會合ノ席上帝國全權ヨリ三國妥協  
案ノ内容ト了解セル所ヲ確認セシムル爲提示セル文書

- 右會合ノ結果右文書ノ字句ニ些少ノ修正ヲ加ヘラレタリ其ノ修正左ノ如ク  
 (イ) 八吋巡洋艦米國保有量十八萬噸ヲ記載シタル後一九三五年前ニシテ十五萬噸以上ヲ竣工セザルモノヲ記載  
 シ居レバカ日本原案ニク Prior to the Conference in 1935 ノトモニチ Prior to 1935 ノ修正ヤ  
 (ロ) 最後ニ日本原案ニク無カシム左記ヲ追加ヤ and an agreement as to the scrapping down to 15-15-9

*Strictly Confidential.*

POINTS TO BE CONFIRMED.

I. It is understood that the purport of the compromise plan is as follows:—

1) The holdings in the auxiliary craft by the United States, Great Britain and Japan in 1936 will be:—

a) 8-inch gun cruisers:

United States: 18 units—180,000 tons.

Prior to the Conference in 1935, more than 15 units—150,000 tons will not be completed. The 16th unit will be laid down in 1933, the 17th in 1934, the 18th in 1935.

Great Britain: 15 units—146,800 tons.

Japan ... : 12 units—108,400 tons.

In case the United States build more than 15 units—150,000 tons, Japan will be free to claim at the Conference of 1935 the right to build correspondingly. The formula of reservation in this sense to be agreed upon.

b) 6-inch gun cruisers:

United States ... : 143,500 tons.

Great Britain ... : 192,200 tons.

Japan ... : 100,450 tons.

c) Destroyers:

United States and Great Britain... 150,000 tons each.

Japan ... : 105,500 tons.

d) Submarines:

United States, Great Britain and Japan:

52,700 tons each.

Totals: United States ... : 526,400 tons.

Great Britain ... : 541,700 tons.

Japan ... : 367,050 tons.

2) The Treaty to be in force until the end of 1936. As to the arrangements thereafter, they will be considered at the Conference of the Signatory Powers to be held in 1935.

3) The provisional agreement now to be made will form part of a Treaty between the Five Powers including France and Italy.

II. As to submarines, it is understood that in case the tonnage to be held by the United States and Great Britain becomes larger on account of their relation with France and Italy, the Japanese holdings will automatically be increased to maintain the parity.

III. It is understood that due consideration will be given to the maintenance of shipbuilding art and industry in war vessels in Japan.

IV. The treaty will also comprise an agreement as to the institution of a naval holiday in regard to the capital ships.

(12) 昭和五年四月二日、日英米全權會合ノ席上英米全權ニ

通報セラル帝國政府回訓英譯文

*Strictly Confidential.*

TRANSLATION OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION FROM THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON TUESDAY, APRIL 1ST, 1930.

The Japanese Government place special emphasis on the promotion of international peace and goodwill and have for the purpose of furthering that object a firm resolve to cooperate with the other participating Powers to bring the Naval Conference of London to a successful conclusion. They have examined most carefully the compromise plan in such spirit, and they fear that, since the adoption of the plan will result in a gradual decrease in the actual relative strength of the Japanese Navy in a few years to come, the Japanese people cannot but entertain a sense of uneasiness as to their national defence. In such eventuality, the essential object above referred to will by no means be attained, but on the contrary, suspicions and misunderstandings in international relations will only be deepened. This is what the Japanese Government view with the most serious concern. It is however understood that the plan under review is intended merely to take care of the situation up to 1936 and, as to the naval strengths to be possessed by the Powers concerned thereafter, they will be discussed and decided anew at the Conference of 1935. The Japanese Government, therefore, sincerely appreciating the spirit of accommodation and cooperation manifested by the American and British Delegations in the formulation of the present plan, have decided to agree to make the plan form the substance of the Treaty to be drafted.

2. Such being the fundamental thought that has prompted the Japanese Government to come to this decision, it is considered necessary, in giving their accord to the arrangement as to the 8-inch gun cruisers, to do so only on a precise understanding that it will not have a binding force and will be entirely without prejudice to the claim or stand of Japan in this respect at the Conference of 1935. It may certainly be self-evident but it is believed highly important to reiterate this point and make the situation unmistakably clear so as to assuage the possible disquietude of the people.

3. As to the question of submarines, it will be easily understood by the American and British Delegations that the proposal contained in the present plan will seriously operate against the maintenance of the ship-building art and industry of Japan. Since no new building in submarines is thereby authorised, the discharge of skilled mechanics and the closing of several of the private yards will consequently be necessitated. The result will be that the question of unemployment will become thereby even more accentuated. While the Japanese Government do not desire to add complications to the work of the Conference by proposing a material amendment in this connection to the plan under review, they wish to make a frank statement of the practical difficulties which Japan will surely encounter on this score and sincerely hope that the other Powers concerned will give a friendly consideration to the matter in order to work out some means to alleviate such difficulties. In seeking the solution of this point, they are of course actuated by no other motive than to carry the matter to a successful issue.

Further, it is to be understood that, in case the tonnage to be held by the United States and Great Britain in submarines will become larger on account of their relations with France and Italy or for any other reason, the Japanese holdings will automatically be increased to maintain the parity.

(13) 昭和五年四月二日、日英米全權會合ノ際三國妥協ノ内容

確認ノ爲「リリー」ノ持参セル文書

POINTS TO BE CONFIRMED PREPARED BY SENATOR REED ON

APRIL 2ND, 1930.

BATTLESHIPS

No new ships to be laid down before December 31, 1936.

Great Britain to commence to scrap before December 31, 1931 :

TIGER

EMPEROR OF INDIA

MARLBOROUGH

BENBOW

IRON DUKE

United States to commence to scrap within same period :

FLORIDA

UTAH

ARKANSAS

Japan to commence to scrap within the same period :

KONGO or any other capital ship selected by Japan.

Other ships to be continued in service until December 31, 1936.

8-inch CRUISERS

United States 180,000 tons (18 ships)

No. 16 not to be laid down before January 1, 1933.

No. 17 not to be laid down before January 1, 1934.  
No. 18 not to be laid down before January 1, 1935.

Great Britain 146,800 tons (15 ships)

11 of 10,000 tons now completed

2 of 10,000 tons now building

2 of 8,400 tons now building

108,400 tons.

Japan

4 of 7,100 tons now completed

4 of 10,000 tons now completed

4 of 10,000 tons now building

6-inch CRUISERS

United States 143,500 tons

10 Omahas of 7,050 tons each

73,000 tons of new 6" cruisers.

Great Britain 192,200 tons

21 existing cruisers-101,200 tons

14 new cruisers-91,000 tons

Japan

100,450 tons

17 existing cruisers-81,450 tons

19,000 tons of new cruisers

United States has option of

15-8" cruisers-150,000 tons

189,000 tons 6" (incl. 10 Omahas)

Great Britain has option of

176,800 tons of 8" (18 ships)

146,700 tons of 6" (incl. 75,000 existing)

DESTROYERS

United States	150,000
Great Britain	150,000
Japan	105,500

SUBMARINES

Parity at 52,700 tons (Japanese replacement schedule to be arranged by experts)

Note: The foregoing figures may be revised (preserving the same relative strengths among the three powers) by necessities growing out of the programs of other powers.

(14)

昭和五年四月七日「リード」カ齋藤部長ニ手交セル次回會議及  
倫敦條約カ次回會議ニ於ケル締約國ノ立場ヲ拘束セサルコト  
ニ關スル條文案

RITZ HOTEL

April 7, 1930.

SENATOR REED'S FORMULA

There shall be inserted in the Treaty itself a clause in substance as follows:

There shall be a restatement of the agreement in the Washington Treaty that a Conference will be held in 1935 and a statement of the expectation of the signatories that such conference will in turn be followed from time to time by other conferences. Such clause shall further state that the terms of the present agreement do not commit any of the signatory powers in principle at the next Conference.

## (15) 帝國輕巡洋艦及驅逐艦ノ代換ニ關スル確認(昭和五年四月十日)ノ書付

昭和五年四月八日、日英米全權會議ニ於テ我輕巡洋艦及驅逐艦ノ代換ニ關シ會談アリ意見ノ一致ヲ見タルガ本書付ン之ヲ確認セシムル爲メ同四月九日ノ三國全權會議ノ際我方ヨリ英米兩國全權ニ呈示シ四月十日其ノ確認ヲ得タルモノナリ  
尙本代換問題ニ關セザン特別專門委員會 (Committee of Principal Naval Adviser) 諸事録參照ノ  
ベシ

TO BE CONFIRMED

## 1. Light Cruisers.

(a) Those laid down prior to 1st January, 1920, may be replaced upon the basis of a replacement age of 16 years.

(b) By the end of 1936, Japan, in addition to building the 2,085 ton difference between the allotted tonnage and the existing tonnage, shall be entitled to lay down for replacement the equivalent of 48,920 tons comprising the 11 vessels from Tone to Oi, or a total of 50,955 tons.

## 2. Destroyers.

(a) Those laid down prior to 1st January, 1921, may be replaced upon the basis of a replacement age of 12 years.

(b) As a result of the application of the replacement age mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Japan will scrap 52,740 tons by the end of 1936; and of that amount, the 26,610 tons by which the existing tonnage exceeds the allotted tonnage will be scrapped gradually up to the end of 1936. As against the balance of 26,130 tons, an average of 5,200 tons may be laid down for replacement each year from 1930 to 1934 inclusive.

(c) In order that approximately 5,200 tons might be laid down annually in 1935 and 1936 also, a part of the vessels which are to reach the replacement age of 16 years in 1938 and 1939 may be moved up for that purpose.

.....

## (右邦文)

## 一、輕巡洋艦

(イ) 一九二〇年一月一日以前ニ起工セルモノハ艦齡十六年ニテ代換シ得

(ロ) 日本ハ一九三六年末迄ニ保有量ト現有量トノ差二、〇三五噸ヲ建造スルノ外利根ヨリ大井迄十一隻四八、九二〇噸ニ相當スル代換ヲ起工シ得即一九三六年末迄ニ合計五〇、九五五噸ヲ建造ス

## 二、驅逐艦

(イ) 一九二一年一月一日以前ニ起工セルモノハ艦齡十二年ニテ代換スルコトヲ得

(ロ) 前項代換艦齡適用ノ結果日本ハ一九三六年末迄ニ五二、七四〇噸ヲ廢棄スルコトトナリ内保有量ニ對スル現有量ノ超過量二六、六一〇噸ハ一九三六年末迄ニ逐次ニ之ヲ廢棄シ残り二六、一三〇噸ニ對シテハ一九三〇年以降一九三四年迄毎年平均五、二〇〇噸ノ代艦ヲ起工シ得

(ハ) 一九三五年及一九三六年ニ於テモ前項同様年額約五、二〇〇噸ヲ起工シ得ル如ク一九三八年及一九三九年ニ艦齡滿限トナルモノ中ヨリ其ノ一部ヲ繰上ケ起工ス

## (16) 古鷹級亡失ノ場合ノ代換ニ關スル昭和五年四月八日、日英米全權

## 會議議事録草案

本草案ハ同年四月九日事務總長ヨリ送付アリタルモノナリ

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

Secretariat General,  
St. James's Palace,  
London, S. W. I.  
April 9, 1930.

Dear Mr. Wakatsuki,

I should be much obliged if you would scrutinise the attached draft Notes of the meeting on Tuesday on the subject of the replacement of the FURUTAKA Class of Cruiser in case of accident, and let me have any corrections you think desirable. When everyone has corrected it I will forward a final copy officially for record.

Yours sincerely  
M. P. A. Hankey

Mr. Beijiro Wakatsuki,  
Japanese Delegation,  
46, Grosvenor Square.

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

EXTRACT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NOTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN, HELD AT ST. JAMES  
PALACE, LONDON, S.W.1. ON TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1930, AT 12 NOON.  
(To be communicated in its final form to the three Delegations by the Secretary-General.)

Replacement in the  
event of Shipwreck.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said there had been one point left over, namely, the replacement of the FURUTAKA Class in the improbable event of a shipwreck. The Japanese Experts had reported to him that the United Kingdom and American Delegations had not much objection to their building a ship of 8,200 tons to replace the FURUTAKAS in case of shipwreck or accident. That, of course, was a very improbable event, but as the Japanese Delegation attached importance to it he hoped that his request would be received sympathetically.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that the United States and the United Kingdom Experts had felt it important that no country should be permitted to exceed the tonnage laid down in the Agreement, whether that increase resulted from replacement owing to accident or otherwise. They thought that if this contingency should arise the proper course would be for the Japanese Government to make representations at the time to the effect that they did not wish to replace the lost vessel by an unsatisfactory and out-of-date ship. In short, the question should be left over until the case should arise.

SENATOR REED said that of course his Delegation's wish would be to accommodate Japan as far as possible, but there was one very cogent reason against the proposal which, properly speaking, had nothing to do with Japan, namely, that it would open the door within the Treaty to the adoption of a principle that might be capable of misuse and might prove very inconvenient.

Mr. MACDONALD said that it was in that spirit, and in that spirit only, that he felt bound to associate himself with Senator Reed.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that the Japanese Experts had reported to him that the Experts of the United States and the United Kingdom did not appear to object very strongly that Japan should replace any ship of the FURUTAKA Class that might be lost by a ship of over 8,000 tons displacement. In fact, he was told they had gone further and did not object to a 10,000 ton ship so long as the total category tonnage was not exceeded. He believed this report to be worthy of credit. His thought was that it was now necessary to decide these matters very rapidly. If one thing were said in one Committee, and another thing in another, this oscillation of opinion would only cause delay. Consequently, if his friends could agree to an 8,000 ton ship he hoped that this might be inserted in the Treaty. But if it were stated on the records



of the Conference that favourable consideration would be given to the proposal in case the eventually should arise, then he might be satisfied. As he had said on a previous occasion, he had received instructions from Japan on this point, and if it could not be conceded he would have to seek fresh instructions from his Government, and that would involve still further delay. He hoped, therefore, that his friends would give him satisfaction. He surmised that conversations to this effect had taken place at the Experts Committee.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that there had been much informal talk at the Experts Committee and a great deal of ground had been covered.

Mr. MACDONALD said that of course it had always been understood that any increase of size would be on the understanding that the total tonnage was not exceeded.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that this was a physical impossibility.

Mr. WAKATSUKI did not consider that it was a physical impossibility. As he had said on a previous occasion, the increased tonnage could be compensated by some reduction in the 8-inch gun Cruiser tonnage.

Mr. MACDONALD said that such a transfer of tonnage was not acceptable.

COLONEL STIMSON said that of course any country had a right to replace an 8-inch gun Cruiser by one up to 10,000 tons displacement provided that the total tonnage was not exceeded. He understood, however, that Mr. Wakatsuki was speaking of the replacement of the FUBUTAKA Class of 7,100 tons, and that in the event of a casualty to one of those ships he wished to replace it by a Cruiser of from 8,100 to 8,500 tons. That would involve an increase beyond the Japanese aggregate of 103,400 tons for 8-inch gun Cruisers. That was the real point at issue. He understood that while the rule should not be altered, nevertheless if this eventuality should arise Japan would then make a request, and his Government, he felt sure, would be inclined to consider such a request favourably. That was as far as he could go.

Mr. MACDONALD said that if the case should arise it would receive sympathetic consideration.

COLONEL STIMSON said that if the relations of the three countries, as demonstrated by the relations of the Delegations here, were such that if the case arose and Japan made representations to his Government they would receive sympathetic consideration. That was the furthest point to which he could go.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said he much appreciated the attitude of both Delegations towards this question. He suggested that Sir Maurice Hankey should prepare a Minute of the Conversation on this particular point and circulate it to the Delegations concerned, for record.

COLONEL STIMSON said he had no objection.

Mr. MACDONALD said that he also had no objection.

COLONEL STIMSON thought that the note should be retained for the confidential use of the Governments.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that this understanding was in opposition to his instructions, but he would endeavour to secure the assent of his Government to the arrangement.

Mr. MACDONALD said that so far as the Treaty was concerned, a clause ought to be included to provide that ships lost by accident should be replaced.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY pointed out that a clause to that effect was included in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I (c) of the Washington Treaty.

COLONEL STIMSON said the point was also provided for in one of the Memoranda submitted by his Delegation. Mr. MACDONALD said he thought it was generally agreed that the undertaking to give sympathetic consideration to the desire of the Japanese Government in the event of the loss of a Cruiser of the FUBUTAKA Class should not be included in the Treaty but should be kept as a confidential matter between the three Governments. He hoped that the Japanese Delegation would appreciate what a large concession this was.

(17) 古鷹級亡失ノ場合ノ代換ニ關スル昭和五年四月八日、日英米全權  
會議議事録草案ニ對スル我方訂正案

本訂正案ハ昭和五年四月十一日露艦部員ヨリ申入レタルモノナリ

April 11th, 1930.

Dear Sir Maurice,

I am instructed by Mr. Wakasuki to acknowledge receipt of your note of April 9th and to return to you your draft notes of the meeting on Tuesday, on the subject of the replacement of the Furutaka Class Cruisers in case of accident, with corrections.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) Hiroei Saito.

Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

CRUISERS.

—  
THE "FURU-  
TAKA" CLASS.

—  
Replacement in the  
event of Shipwreck.

EXTRACT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NOTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE DELEGA-  
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN, HELD AT ST.  
JAMES'S PALACE, LONDON, S.W.1, ON TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1930, AT 12 NOON.

(To be communicated in its final form to the Three Delegations by the Secretary-General.)

*Mr. WAKATSUKI said there had been one point left over, namely, the replacement of the FURUTAKA Class in the improbable event of a shipwreck. As he had stated when he had communicated to the United Kingdom and American Delegations the instructions from Tokio the other day, it was the desire of Japan to build a ship of from 8,000 tons to 8,500 tons in replacement and the Japanese Experts had reported to him that the United Kingdom and American Delegations had not much objection to such building. That of course was a very improbable event but as it was a matter expressly mentioned in the instructions from the Government and the Japanese Delegation attached importance to it, he hoped that his request would be received sympathetically.*

ADMIRAL FISHER said that the United States and the United Kingdom Experts had felt it important that no country should be permitted to exceed the tonnage laid down in the Agreement, whether that increase resulted from replacement owing to accident or otherwise. They thought that if this contingency should arise the proper course would be for the Japanese Government to make representations at the time to the effect that they did not wish to replace the lost vessel by an unsatisfactory and out-of-date ship. In short, the question should be left over until the case should arise.

SENATOR REED said that of course his Delegation's wish would be to accommodate Japan as far as possible, but there was one very cogent reason against the proposal which, properly speaking, had nothing to do with Japan, namely, that it would open the door within the Treaty to the adoption of a principle that might be capable of misuse and might prove very inconvenient.

Mr. MACDONALD said that it was in that spirit, and in that spirit only, that he felt bound to associate himself with Senator Reed.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that the Japanese Experts had reported to him that the Experts of the United States and the United Kingdom did not appear to object very strongly that Japan should replace any ship of the FURUTAKA Class that might be lost by a ship of over 8,000 tons displacement. In fact, he was told they had gone further and did not object to a 10,000 ton ship so long as the total category tonnage was not exceeded. He believed this report to be worthy of credit. His thought was that it was now necessary to decide these matters very rapidly. If one thing were said in one Committee, and another thing in another, this oscillation of opinion would only cause delay. Consequently, if his friends could agree to a from 8,000 to 8,500 ton ship, he hoped that this might be inserted in the Treaty. But if it were not acceptable to do so, he would like to see a decision made to have it stated on the records of the Conference that favourable consideration would be given to the proposal in case the eventually should arise. As he had said on a previous occasion, he had received instructions from Japan on this point, and if it could not be conceded he would have to seek fresh instructions from his Government, and that would involve still further delay. He hoped, therefore, that his friends would give him satisfaction. He surmised that conversations to this effect had taken place at the Experts Committee.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that there had been much informal talk at the Experts Committee and a great deal of ground had been covered.

Mr. MACDONALD said that of course it had always been understood that any increase of size would be on the understanding that the total tonnage was not exceeded.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that this was a physical impossibility.

Mr. MACDONALD concurred in the Admiral's statement.

Mr. WAKATSUKI did not consider that it was a physical impossibility. As he had said on a previous occasion, the increased tonnage could be compensated by some reduction in the 6-inch gun Cruiser tonnage.

Mr. MACDONALD said that such a transfer of tonnage was not acceptable.

COLONEL STIMSON said that of course any country had a right to replace an 8-inch gun Cruiser by one up to 10,000 tons displacement provided that the total tonnage was not exceeded. He understood, however, that Mr. Wakatsuki was speaking of the replacement of the FUBUTAKA Class of 7,100 tons, and that in the event of a casualty to one of those ships he wished to replace it by a Cruiser of from 8,000 to 8,500 tons. That would involve an increase beyond the Japanese aggregate of 108,400 tons for 8-inch gun Cruisers. That was the real point at issue. He understood that while the rule should not be altered, nevertheless if this eventually should arise Japan would then make a request, and his Government, he felt, sure, would be inclined to consider such a request favourably. That was as far as he could go.

Mr. MACDONALD said that if the case should arise it would receive sympathetic consideration.

COLONEL STIMSON said that the relations of the three countries, as demonstrated by the relations of the Delegations here, were such that if the case arose and Japan made representations to his Government they would receive sympathetic consideration. That was the furthest point to which he could go.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said he much appreciated the attitude of both Delegations towards this question. He suggested that Sir Maurice Hankey should prepare a Minute of the Conversation on this particular point and circulate it to the Delegations concerned, for record.

COLONEL STIMSON said he had no objection.

Mr. MACDONALD said he also had no objection.

COLONEL STIMSON thought that the note should be retained for the confidential use of the Governments.

*Mr. WAKATSUKI said the instructions from the Government required that the matter should be expressly mentioned in the Treaty and therefore this understanding was not in accordance with the requirements of Tokio. But in order to come to an agreement, he would recommend the Government to agree to decide the matter in the way just suggested and he would do his best to get the Government to make that decision.*

Mr. MACDONALD said that so far as the Treaty was concerned, a clause ought to be included to provide that ships lost by accident should be replaced.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY pointed out that a clause to that effect was included in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I (c) of the Washington Treaty.

COLONEL STIMSON said the point was also provided for in one of the Memoranda submitted by his Delegation.

*Mr. WAKATSUKI said that that was a matter of course and his proposal had been advanced on the premises that such an article would be inserted in the Treaty.*

Mr. MACDONALD said he thought it was generally agreed that the undertaking to give sympathetic consideration to the desire of the Japanese Government in the event of the loss of a Cruiser of the FUBUTAKA Class should not be included in the Treaty but should be kept as a confidential matter between the three Governments. He hoped that the Japanese Delegation would appreciate what a large concession this was.

(18) 古鷹級亡失ノ場合ノ代換ニ關スル昭和五年四月八日、日英米全權會議議事録(同月十七日附事務總長書翰及同月二十一日附若槻全權書翰)

前記齋藤部長ヨリ申入レタメ訂正ト比較スルニ第二九〇頁「スチヤン」陳述ノ字句中ニ「字ノ差異」云々ニ即チ齋藤部長申入レニ「Favourably」云々トシテ本交書ニ於テ「sympathetically」トナシ居テ

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

Secretariat General,  
St. James's Palace,  
London, S. W. I.

17th April, 1930.

*Confidential.*

Your Excellency,

I am directed by the Chairman of the London Naval Conference to enclose for record a copy of the Secretary-General's notes of part of a meeting between the Heads and other representatives of the Delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Japan, held on Tuesday, 8th April, at 12 noon. These notes contain a record of a discussion on the subject of the replacement, in the event of loss by accident, of a cruiser of the Japanese "Furutaka" class.

Similar letters have been sent to Mr. Stimson and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency,

Your obedient Servant,  
(Sgd.) M. P. A. Hankey.

Mr. Reijiro Wakatsuki.

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

EXTRACT FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NOTES OF A MEETING  
BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN, HELD AT ST.  
JAMES'S PALACE, LONDON, S.W.1. ON TUESDAY,  
APRIL 8, 1930, AT 12 NOON.

PRESENT:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State.  
The Hon. David A. Reed,  
United States Senator.  
Mr. J. Theodore Marriner.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The Right Hon. J. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P.,  
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.  
The Right Hon. A.V. Alexander, M.P.,  
First Lord of the Admiralty.  
Vice-Admiral Sir William W. Fisher, K.C.B.,  
C.V.O., Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.  
Mr. R.L. Craigie, C.M.G.

Captain R.M. Bellairs, C.M.G., R.N.,  
Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, M.P.

JAPAN.

Mr. Reijiro Wakatsuki,  
Member of the House of Peers.  
Admiral Takeshi Takarabe,  
Minister of Marine.

Mr. Tsuneo Matsudaira,  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James.  
Mr. Hiroshi Saito.

SECRETARY-GENERAL, LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE.

Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

CRUISERS.

THE "FURUTAKA"  
CLASS.

Replacement in  
the event of  
Shipwreck.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said there had been one point left over, namely, the replacement of the FURUTAKA Class in the improbable event of a shipwreck. As he has stated when he had communicated to the United Kingdom and American Delegations the instructions from Tokio the other day, it was the desire of Japan to build a ship of from 8,000 tons to 8,500 tons in replacement and the Japanese Experts had reported to him that the United Kingdom and American Delegations had not much objection to such building. That of course was a very improbable event but as it was a matter expressly mentioned in the instructions from the Government and the Japanese Delegation attached importance to it, he hoped that his request would be received sympathetically.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that the United States and the United Kingdom Experts had felt it important that no country should be permitted to exceed the tonnage laid down in the Agreement, whether that increase resulted from replacement owing to accident or otherwise. They thought that

if this contingency should arise the proper course would be for the Japanese Government to make representations at the time to the effect that they did not wish to replace the lost vessel by an unsatisfactory and out-of-date ship. In short, the question should be left over until the case should arise.

SENATOR REED said that of course his Delegation's wish would be to accommodate Japan as far as possible, but there was one very cogent reason against the proposal which, properly speaking, had nothing to do with Japan, namely, that it would open the door within the Treaty to the adoption of a principle that might be capable of misuse and might prove very inconvenient.

Mr. MACDONALD said that it was in that spirit, and in that spirit only, that he felt bound to associate himself with Senator Reed.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that the Japanese Experts had reported to him that the Experts of the United States and the United Kingdom did not appear to object very strongly that Japan should replace any ship of the FURUTAKA Class that might be lost by a ship of over 8,000 tons displacement. In fact, he was told they had gone further and did not object to a 10,000 ton ship so long as the total category tonnage was not exceeded. He believed this report to be worthy of credit. His thought was that it was now necessary to decide these matters very rapidly. If one thing were said in one Committee, and another thing in another, this oscillation of opinion would only cause delay. Consequently, if his friends could agree to a from 8,000 to 8,500 ton ship, he hoped that this might be inserted in the Treaty. But if it were not acceptable to do so, he would like to see a decision made to have it stated on the records of the Conference that favourable consideration would be given to the proposal in case the eventuality should arise. As he had said on a previous occasion, he had received instructions from Japan on this point, and if it could not be conceded he would have to seek fresh instructions from his Government, and that would involve still further delay. He hoped, therefore, that his friends would give him satisfaction. He surmised that conversations to this effect had taken place at the Experts Committee.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that there had been much informal talk at the Experts Committee and a great deal of ground had been covered.

Mr. MACDONALD said that of course it had always been understood that any increase of size would be on the understanding that the total tonnage was not exceeded.

ADMIRAL FISHER said that this was a physical impossibility.

Mr. MACDONALD concurred in the Admiral's statement.

Mr. WAKATSUKI did not consider that it was a physical impossibility. As he had said on a previous occasion, the increased tonnage could be compensated by some reduction in the 6-inch gun Cruiser tonnage.

Mr. MACDONALD said that such a transfer of tonnage was not acceptable.

COLONEL STIMSON said that of course any country had a right to replace an 8-inch gun Cruiser by one up to 10,000 tons displacement provided that the total tonnage was not exceeded. He understood, however, that Mr. Wakatsuki was speaking of the replacement of the FURUTAKA Class of 7,100 tons, and that in the event of a casualty to one of those ships he wished to replace it by a Cruiser of from 8,000 to 8,500 tons. That would involve an increase beyond the Japanese aggregate of 108,400 tons for 8-inch gun Cruisers. That was the real point at issue. He understood that while the rule should not be altered, nevertheless if this eventuality should arise Japan would then make a request, and his Government, he felt sure, would be inclined to consider such a request sympathetically. That was as far as he could go.

Mr. MACDONALD said that if the case should arise it would receive sympathetic consideration.

COLONEL STIMSON said that the relations of the three countries, as demonstrated by the relations of the Delegations here, were such that if the case arose and Japan made representations to his Government they would receive sympathetic consideration. That was the furthest point to which he could go.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said he much appreciated the attitude of both Delegations towards this question. He suggested that Sir Maurice Hankey should prepare a Minute of the Conversation on this particular point and circulate it to the Delegations concerned, for record.

COLONEL STIMSON said he had no objection.

Mr. MACDONALD said he also had no objection.

COLONEL STIMSON thought that the note should be retained for the confidential use of the Governments.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said the instructions from the Government required that the matter should be expressly mentioned in the Treaty and therefore this understanding was not in accordance with the requirements of Tokio. But in order to come to an agreement, he would recommend the Government to agree to decide the matter in the way just suggested and he would do his best to get the Government to make that decision.

Mr. MACDONALD said that so far as the Treaty was concerned, a clause ought to be included to provide that ships lost by accident should be replaced.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY pointed out that a clause to that effect was included in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I (c) of the Washington Treaty.

COLONEL STIMSON said the point was also provided for in one of the Memoranda submitted by his Delegation.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that that was a matter of course and his proposal had been advanced on the premises that such an article would be inserted in the Treaty.

Mr. MACDONALD said he thought it was generally agreed that the undertaking to give sympathetic consideration to the desire of the Japanese Government in the event if the loss of a Cruiser of the FURUTAKA Class should not be included in the Treaty but should be kept as a confidential matter between the three Governments. He hoped that the Japanese Delegation would appreciate what a large concession this was.

*Confidential.*

April 21st, 1930.

Dear Sir Maurice,

I beg to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of the 17th April, enclosing a copy of the Secretary-General's Notes of part of a meeting between the Heads and other representatives of the Delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Japan, held on Tuesday, 8th April, at noon, on the subject of the replacement, in the event of loss by accident, of a cruiser of the Japanese "Furutaka" class, which you so kindly sent to me for record.

I take note similar letters have been sent to Mr. Stimson and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Wakatsuki.

Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

(19) 「オパシヨ」問題ニ關スル昭和五年四月十五日、日米全權會談議事録

將米ノ參事ノ爲總務部長ノ題旨ニ應ジテ米國國ニシテ付ヤチヨシガノナニモ重要問題ナ  
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PROCES-VERBAL REGARDING THE QUESTION OF THE OPTION.

At a Meeting at the Hotel Ritz of the Japanese and American Delegations (Mr. Wakatsuki, Admiral Takarabe, Colonel Stimson, Senator Reed and Admiral Pratt) on the 15th April, 1930, the following conversations took place:

SENATOR REED said that it occurred to some of their Japanese friends that if America exercised the option to build 45,500 tons of light cruisers in lieu of 30,000 tons of 8-inch gun cruisers, he understood some of the Japanese naval officers had some apprehension that the whole thing might be completed within the next two or three years. When Mr. Saito had called here last night I had told him that Admiral Pratt's construction programme he understood would be spread over many years, and even in case the option was exercised there was no reasonable possibility that the extra tonnage would be completed by 1936.

Mr. WAKATSUKI thanked the Senator for his clear statement of the situation, and he felt that the Japanese navy would feel reassured in the matter.

SENATOR REED said that his assurance would be confirmed by the Chairman of the American Delegation, Colonel Stimson, and by Admiral Pratt. He hoped that no more complication should be introduced to the agreement now completed between the three Powers. Even minor changes made, even if inevitable, increased the difficulty which the American Delegation would feel in relation to the Senate. He wished that the Japanese Delegation would consider the assurances given in the present form to be satisfactory.

COLONEL STIMSON said that Admiral Pratt knew the facts of the building programme and also the facts of normal construction ability. He meant the construction ability in time of peace, not war; he could only speak from his general understanding, but he was willing to confirm Senator Reed's statement.

ADMIRAL PRATT said that this matter had been brought to his attention yesterday. He had been asked whether it was the intention of the American navy to choose the option of 15 8-inch gun cruisers instead of the option of 18 such vessels. He had said that so far as the navy department was concerned, to the best of his knowledge, (he expected himself to be in the navy department), there was no intention on its part to elect the 15 8-inch gun cruisers' option, but in case they did choose that option, the American construction programme would be so laid out that they expected to build gradually. Therefore, the point raised was one of no importance, since they had 73,000 tons of 6" gun cruisers to lay down entirely outside of the tonnage in that class of vessels involved in the option. And that tonnage would probably occupy all of the building facilities of the country up to 1936. As he visualised the naval programme, it would extend even beyond 1936. Even if they could do it, it was not their present intention to hasten the construction.

COLONEL STIMSON asked the Admiral whether in time of peace more rapid construction would constitute an exception so far as the authorisation was concerned.

ADMIRAL PRATT replied that the present plans of construction contemplated a reasonable amount of expenditure. He would rather have an even programme than an intensive construction. In fact, intensive building would work very badly for replacement, and further, jump the expenditure in a certain year or years too much. And the navy would find it harder to get the consent of Congress. Practically the matter of economy in construction had to be taken into consideration.

Mr. WAKATSUKI expressed his sincere appreciation of these statements and confirmations that had been made in such frank and gentleman-like manner and which elucidated the point most clearly. The Japanese Government and the navy now need not entertain any apprehension in regard to this matter.

SENATOR REED said that in the future the two Powers would again meet in conference for the same purpose. It would be most important that friendship and goodwill between our two countries should be increased in the meantime. Sporadic building programme would from this point of view surely be unwise and cause apprehension. It was not the intention of America to do so.

(20) 保障條項問題ニ關スル昭和五年四月十六日、日英米全權會談議事録

(國府十六日附錄海軍部會議文四十五号附錄海軍部會議錄)

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

Secretariat General,  
St. James's Palace,  
London, S. W. I.

April 16, 1930.

*Confidential.*

My dear Saito,

I enclose a draft of my notes of this morning's Meeting.

I came to Downing Street at 9 o'clock to say goodbye to the Prime Minister before his holiday, and I had no idea that a Meeting was to take place. I had no material for taking notes, and in the early part of the Meeting I did not take any notes, as I had assumed it was only to be a short conversation.

I should therefore very much welcome any suggestions you make for corrections in regard to what Mr. Wakatsuki said.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sgd.) M. P. A. HANKEY.

Mr. Hiroshi Saito,  
Japanese Delegation,  
46, Grosvenor Square,  
W. I.



Secret.  
L.N.C. (D) 27.

The attached notes of a private conversation between Heads of Delegations do not bear any official character as a Conference document, and should not be quoted.

(Ind.) M. P. A. HANKEY.

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930.

NOTES OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HEADS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE JAPANESE DELEGATIONS,  
HELD AT 10, DOWNING STREET, S.W. 1, ON WEDNESDAY,  
APRIL 16th, 1930, at 9 a. m.

PRESENT:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State.  
The Hon. David A. Reed,  
United States Senator.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The Right Hon. J. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P.,  
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.  
The Right Hon. A. V. Alexander, M. P.,  
First Lord of the Admiralty.  
Mr. R. L. Craigie, C. M. G.

JAPAN.

Mr. Reijiro Wakatsuki,  
Member of the House of Peers.  
Mr. Hiroshi Saito.

SECRETARY-GENERAL, LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE.

Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.

.....

The subject of the discussion was the draft Clause set out in *Appendix I*.

THREE-  
POWER  
TREATY  
—  
SAFE-  
GUARD-  
ING  
CLAUSE.

Mr. ALEXANDER explained that this Clause had been devised in order to provide against the case of France or Italy, or some Power other than the parties to the Three-Power portion of the Treaty, undertaking such a programme of construction as would materially affect the interests of one of the Three Powers.

Mr. WAKATSUKI asked whether the increase to which the other parties would be entitled was to be automatic or negotiated. As the increases were to be made either in Cruisers or Destroyers it might appear useful to consult through the diplomatic channel.

COLONEL STIMSON pointed out that the word "notify" would amount, in practice, to a communication through diplomatic channels. In that case a Power could increase either in Cruisers or Destroyers, but of course only in the category affected.

Mr. MACDONALD said that the increase would be made after an explanation of the reasons through diplomatic channels. No ships built or building now would affect the question, only ships built after the conclusion of the Treaty. It was only in the event of ships being built after the conclusion of the Treaty which would create a situation such as, if it had existed today, would have compelled the United Kingdom to alter its figures, that this Clause would be invoked.

Mr. WAKATSUKI pointed out that what the Japanese Navy desired was more Submarines. They considered they had enough Destroyers under their programme. Consequently it was difficult for Mr. Wakatsuki to agree to say that when the United Kingdom increased its tonnage in Destroyers they would do the same. If it meant that they could increase in Cruisers the situation would be a little easier.

Mr. ALEXANDER said that he had been working hard to get the figures for Submarines of other Powers reduced. It would increase these difficulties if an increase were made in the Submarines of one of the High Contracting Parties to the Three-Power Agreement. He pointed out that a transfer of 10 per cent. between Cruisers and Destroyers had been agreed to. Japan would receive some advantage in that direction. The point of view of the Admiralty was that that was going about as far as it was possible to go.

Mr. WAKATSUKI pointed out that the increase in Destroyers to which, in certain circumstances, Japan would be entitled under this Agreement meant an increase in the class of vessel which, in the view of the present Naval Advisers of the Government, was not needed. It was true that the Advisers might change, but that was the present position. However, if an opportunity could be given to discuss the situation when it arose, through diplomatic channels, then he might be able to agree. If there were to be no negotiations and Japan were to be compelled to make her increase in certain classes, it would be difficult to accept. He hoped that this Clause was not to upset the good agreement that had been reached.

Mr. MACDONALD said that this clause was not going to be invoked owing to any action by the Three Powers. It was purely a European problem affecting only the Mediterranean and Atlantic. If it would be of any value, he would be willing to undertake that any temporary increase in strength that might have to be made through invoking this clause should not be reckoned as a basis for the figures in the negotiations for 1935, that is to say, any additional building undertaken through the application of this clause should not be taken into account in the permanent

strengths, unless the circumstances that led to the increase remained. It would not be an increase in the figures of the Treaty but a temporary increase to meet a particular situation. If it would be of any help, he thought some arrangement might be made on those lines.

COLONEL STIMSON said that this proposal had not been made by the American Delegation. He was rather afraid of it and would have preferred to rest on the figures in the Treaty. The reason for it was that Great Britain had come to them with a special situation which they claimed would affect them and had stated that they must be sufficiently free in case a situation arose which endangered their equilibrium. He had felt bound to recognise this possibility. He had then asked Mr. Alexander to narrow down the clause as much as possible, because in his country it would otherwise be said that the agreement was being spoilt. Mr. Alexander had made the clause very narrow. If the clause had been so drawn as to open up the possibility of an increase on general grounds, apart from the Mediterranean countries, in America it would be stated that it reversed the whole agreement. Consequently, it would be necessary to explain that it only affected the Mediterranean, and not America and Japan, and that if Great Britain had to increase her construction, the other two Powers would have the same rights. He very much doubted if his Government would avail itself of the power of increase. If now the whole treaty was to be opened up, it would cause anxiety and his people would say "If that is the result, it would have been better not to have begun the negotiations."

Mr. WAKATSUKI said he quite understood the British need of some such clause. From the point of view of Japan, to make the clause so clear-cut would cause difficulties. If the clause could be phrased so that the privilege of increasing cruisers and destroyers could be discussed through diplomatic channels, with a view to deciding what was to be done, it would make it easier for him. To decide on this clause as it stood would be to create difficulties and to jeopardise the treaty.

SENATOR REED said that the American position was the same as the Japanese. They did not want to add to their destroyer category because Great Britain did so.

Mr. CRAIGIE suggested that Great Britain might notify the amount of the increase and that might be followed by consultation as to the effect.

Mr. MACDONALD said that that would be to reopen the whole treaty.

COLONEL STIMSON said it would compel the American Government to bring the whole question again before the Senate.

SENATOR REED pointed out that the clause did not really affect the United States and Japan in the first instance. It had been devised simply to meet the difficulties in the Mediterranean.

Mr. MACDONALD confirmed that it would not affect the Three Power Treaty directly. Great Britain would never invoke the clause except in the case of sheer necessity.

Mr. WAKATSUKI quite understood. Japan was willing that Great Britain should have that privilege, but in the present form the clause would cause great difficulties in Japan.

Mr. MACDONALD said that if he could obtain an understanding from Italy and France that their building programme during the next year or two would be accommodated to the treaty, it would make the situation much easier, but if the Three Power portion of the treaty were signed and France were to build twelve large cruisers, public opinion would not stand it.

SENATOR REED put for consideration the proposal that when notice of an increase is received from Great Britain, the other two parties should consult as to their action. The rest of the draft would remain as it stands, that is to say, on receiving notice from Great Britain, Japan and America would consult together in a friendly way and talk the matter over. That seemed the most friendly arrangement.

Mr. ALEXANDER said it was merely putting in the treaty what would happen in practice.

COLONEL STIMSON said that Senator Reed's proposition appeared to be to add at the end of the draft paragraph "The other Powers shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus presented."

SENATOR REED said his idea was that the moment they received notice from Great Britain, the other Two Powers should get into touch through diplomatic channels.

COLONEL STIMSON said it left the draft in other respects exactly as it was, except that now there would be a consultation.

Mr. WAKATSUKI suggested that if there were an agreement to consult, apart from the fact that Great Britain had the right to build, it ought to make Great Britain's negotiations with France and Italy easier.

Mr. ALEXANDER pointed out that the three countries here represented had an equilibrium between themselves. If that equilibrium were upset in the Mediterranean any increase ought to be pro rata between the three.

Mr. WAKATSUKI pointed out that he had succeeded in convincing his Government to accept the draft Treaty largely owing to the flexible arrangement in regard to 8-inch gun cruiser. If they were bound to make a proportionate in 8-inch gun cruisers they would apparently have to make it on a 60 per cent. basis. This would create a great difficulty in Japan.

Mr. ALEXANDER said that from the British point of view he thought that they had been most friendly to the Japanese point of view since the Japanese tonnage in 8-inch gun cruisers would be 74 per cent. of the British and the percentage in numbers would be even higher, viz. 12 to 15. Great Britain had agreed to an equilibrium at the rate of 18-15-12. If Great Britain was compelled to build and Japan had the right to make a proportionate increase which would be arranged after consultation with the United States, they ought to be satisfied.

Mr. WAKATSUKI again emphasised the difficulty he would have in justifying the proportionate increase on the 60 per cent. basis. That would be impossible for him in Japan. He thought that the word 'proportionate' before 'increase' should be taken out because it would be taken to mean 60 per cent. If the word was left in he would have to explain exactly what it meant and that would bring him to the figure of 60 per cent.

Mr. CRAIGIE suggested 'corresponding' for 'proportionate'.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that it was impossible to escape in Japan from the numerical or proportionate idea; to include that would upset the whole Treaty.

Mr. CRAIGIE suggested 'an increase as the result of consultation'.

COLONEL STIMSON said the American people would not approve that. It would amount to upsetting the whole Treaty.

Mr. ALEXANDER suggested to add the words at the end of the draft: 'to undertake to consult'.

COLONEL STIMSON thought the only way in which America and Japan could take advantage of the clause if Great Britain had to invoke it was by the use of the word 'proportionate'. Psychologically that would leave the Treaty as it stood.

Mr. WAKATSUKI again repeated the difficulty that the word 'proportionate' caused for him owing to its apparently meaning 60 per cent.

Mr. ALEXANDER suggested to substitute for the words 'to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories affected', the following: 'to adjust their figures accordingly and will consult together for this purpose'.

COLONEL STIMSON pointed out that that opened the whole Treaty.

Mr. MACDONALD suggested the words 'and shall consult'.

SENATOR REED said that the word "proportionate" did not really change the relations between Japan and the United States. America had the right to build 15 ships now amounting to 150,000 tons. Later on, in the last three years of the Treaty period, they had the right to add 30 per cent. to this, namely, 30,000 tons. Japan was entitled to build 72 per cent. of this. Suppose Great Britain had to build one additional 10,000-ton Cruiser owing to the situation in the Mediterranean, all that America could do under the proposed arrangement would be to build 8,000 tons straight away,

with the right to build 2,000 in the later period. Japan would be entitled to build 72 per cent. of what America was building.

COLONEL STIMSON said that in all probability neither would build.

SENATOR REED, putting the idea he had adumbrated above into more precise language, stated it as follows:—

"In the case of additional American building of 8-inch Cruisers, not more than 80 per cent. of her additional tonnage shall be laid down before 1933".

Mr. WAKATSUKI asked what would be the position if Great Britain built three Cruisers.

SENATOR REED said that in that event America and Japan would each increase 20 per cent. of their respective tonnages, but America would only lay down 80 per cent. of her allocation before 1933.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said it would complicate the situation very much to raise this question.

(At this point SENATOR REED made a calculation to show exactly how the situation would work out.)

SENATOR REED pointed out that if Japan added 20 per cent. and America added 20 per cent. the proportions would remain the same.

(The Secretary-General was out of the room for a short time at this point.)

COLONEL STIMSON said that this was a situation which he had apprehended would arise since the beginning of the negotiations, and which arose out of the French position. This document had been drawn up to ensure that any change which might be necessitated would fall fairly on all three parties.

Mr. WAKATSUKI thought that this was true to a certain extent. The difficulty was that Japan was asked, in certain circumstances, to increase in categories which she did not desire, in order that Great Britain might have greater strength in the categories she most desired.

COLONEL STIMSON said the answer to this was that Great Britain's increase was such a local matter that its inclusion merely showed the good spirit in which the Treaty was drawn up.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that if America could give Japan a Note stating that they did not intend to increase if Great Britain increased, it would greatly ease the situation.

COLONEL STIMSON said that that could not be passed through the Senate.

Mr. WAKATSUKI asked what would be the position if conversations took place between Japan and America through diplomatic channels and the American Government said that they did not intend to build in consequence of the British communication? Was Japan also not to build?

COLONEL STIMSON said that Japan would be quite free. The reason for the consultation was to provide that Japan should not necessarily increase simply from fear that America was going to increase.

Mr. WAKATSUKI, referring to the words "to make a proportionate increase", and the proposed consultation, said that he still felt some misgivings about sending this to Tokyo. He feared it might involve some delay.

Mr. MACDONALD suggested that if he were assured as to the proportions under the treaty, it ought to be all right.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that, as he had mentioned more than once, the political organisation in Japan was rather complicated and it was necessary for him rather to anticipate the discussions that would arise there and he felt that on this point difficulties might be raised. So far as he was concerned, he would agree to recommend it. He had already sent part of the treaty to Japan for approval.

COLONEL STIMSON asked what, in Mr. Wakatsuki's view, the Government had expected on this particular point.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said the Government knew the question would be raised, but had expected some clause similar to Article XXI of the Washington Treaty.

Mr. MACDONALD said that as it appeared to be probable Mr. Wakatsuki was prepared to send a telegram, he would now leave as an aeroplane was waiting for him at Hendon.

(The Prime Minister left the room)

(At this point all those present made exact copies of the revised draft of the clause, as set forth in Appendix II.)

In addition, all took copies of the following clause, which Colonel Stimson offered to state in plenary session as explaining what the United States of America understood the word 'proportionate' to mean :—

"In the case of additional American building of 8" cruisers, not more than 80 per cent. of her additional tonnage shall be *laid down before 1933*."

To meet objections by Mr. Wakatsuki, Colonel Stimson and Senator Reed agreed to alter the formula to read as follows :—

"In the case of additional American building of 8" cruisers, not more than 80 per cent. of her additional tonnage *shall be completed before 1936*."

SENATOR REED said that if Mr. Wakatsuki would like this statement to be made, the American Delegation would make it. If he preferred otherwise, they would not make it.

Mr. ALEXANDER asked what was now to be the procedure? Would Mr. Wakatsuki telegraph the clause to Tokyo?

Mr. WAKATSUKI undertook to do so the same day.

COLONEL STIMSON asked if Mr. Wakatsuki could let him know when he was likely to have a reply? If his plans for leaving on Wednesday were likely to be upset, he ought to know beforehand.

Mr. WAKATSUKI promised to do his best to secure a rapid reply and to keep in touch with Colonel Stimson.

COLONEL STIMSON said that the United States Delegation had originally contemplated some provision on the lines of Article XXI of the Washington Treaty. The recent French attitude, however, had made it so difficult for the British Government that Mr. Alexander had come to him in order to discuss with him a clause which would secure the position for Great Britain without upsetting the whole treaty. He hoped that Mr. Wakatsuki would explain to the government that this was not a situation that could have been foreseen. No one had anticipated it until it came up quite recently in consequence of the French position.

Mr. WAKATSUKI undertook to telegraph at once.

April 16th, 1930.

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#### APPENDIX I.

##### DRAFT CLAUSE.

If, during the term of the present Treaty, the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of cruisers or destroyers are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by the construction programmes of any Power other than those who have joined in Part IV of this Treaty, that High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part IV as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within the categories of cruisers or destroyers and shall be entitled to make such increase. Thereupon the other Parties to Part IV of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories affected.

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#### APPENDIX II.

##### CLAUSE AS AGREED FOR COMMUNICATION TO JAPAN.

If, during the term of the present Treaty, the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of cruisers or destroyers are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by new construction of any Power other than those who have joined in Part IV of this Treaty, that High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part IV as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within the categories of cruisers or destroyers and shall be entitled to make such increase. Thereupon the other Parties to Part IV of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories affected; and the said other Parties shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus presented.

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My dear Sir Maurice,

April 17th, 1930.

I have carefully read your notes of a conversation between the Heads of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Japanese Delegations, held at 10, Downing Street, on Wednesday, April 16th, 1930, at 9 a.m., for the sending of which to me so promptly I wish to return my many thanks.

I wish you would see to it that the following corrections are made:

Page 2.—I think you must have already noticed that “*submarines*” (10th line) should be changed to “*destroyers*”, so that the sentence should be: “He (Mr. Alexander) pointed out that a transfer of 10% between cruisers and *destroyers* had been agreed to”.

Page 10.—In the middle of the page, Mr. Wakatsuki's statement should and: “*she most desired*,” instead of: “*as originally agreed*”, so that the passage would read: “In order that Great Britain might have greater strength in the categories “*she most desired*”.

With many thanks, believe me,

Very sincerely yours,

(sgd.) H. Saito.

Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

(21) 保障條項問題ニ關シ最終總會ノ席上英國首相ノ爲スヘキ聲明草案

10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall  
18th April, 1930.

Dear Mr. Sato,

I am sending you the enclosed in accordance with the arrangement between yourself and Mr. Craigie.

Yours very truly,  
C.P. Duff (Sgd.)

M. Naotake Sato.

SAFEGUARDING CLAUSE.

For inclusion in the Prime Minister's speech at the Plenary.

In the draft Article the words used are "materially affected by the new construction of any Power."

By this we mean that we might be obliged to have recourse to this clause if at any time hereafter the position of any Power or Powers in ships built, building and authorised becomes such as materially to affect our naval position.

But we want to make it perfectly clear that we have no intention of operating this Clause unless it is absolutely necessary and we have every hope that as a result of the conversations after the adjournment of the London Conference a position will be arrived at where it will be unnecessary to have recourse to it.

第四部 議題及議事進行方法ニ關スル文書

- (1) 會議開會日其他ニ關スル昭和四年十一月十一日附在京英國大使  
來翰及帝國政府返翰

URGENT.  
No. 222.

British Embassy,  
Tokyo,  
11th November 1929.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's notice that I am in receipt of a telegram from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informing me that it is suggested that the proposed Naval Disarmament Conference in London should hold its first session on the morning of Tuesday, the 21st of January next.

2. I should accordingly be grateful if Your Excellency would be so good as to inform me whether this date is agreeable to the Imperial Government. In that event I shall have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency in due course particulars in regard to the time and place of meeting.

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider it most desirable that no technical experts should be nominated as delegates by any of the participating governments, though experts would, of course, be present in the conference room in an advisory capacity. This would be in conformity with previous practice and I venture to express the hope that the Imperial Government will feel able to agree to the adoption of this procedure on the present occasion.

4. I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will be so good as to favour me with the views of the Imperial Government in the matter at as early a date as possible.

1107